Report March 2025
Your organisation description
Empowering fact-checkers
Commitment 30
Relevant Signatories commit to establish a framework for transparent, structured, open, financially sustainable, and non-discriminatory cooperation between them and the EU fact-checking community regarding resources and support made available to fact-checkers.
We signed up to the following measures of this commitment
Measure 30.1 Measure 30.2 Measure 30.3 Measure 30.4
In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?
If yes, list these implementation measures here
Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?
If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?
Measure 30.1
Relevant Signatories will set up agreements between them and independent fact-checking organisations (as defined in whereas (e)) to achieve fact-checking coverage in all Member States. These agreements should meet high ethical and professional standards and be based on transparent, open, consistent and non-discriminatory conditions and will ensure the independence of fact-checkers.
SLI 30.1.1
Relevant Signatories will report on Member States and languages covered by agreements with the fact-checking organisations, including the total number of agreements with fact-checking organisations, per language and, where relevant, per service.
| Country | Nr of agreements with fact-checking organisations |
|---|---|
| Austria | 0 |
| Belgium | 0 |
| Bulgaria | 0 |
| Croatia | 2 |
| Cyprus | 0 |
| Czech Republic | 0 |
| Denmark | 0 |
| Estonia | 0 |
| Finland | 0 |
| France | 0 |
| Germany | 0 |
| Greece | 0 |
| Hungary | 0 |
| Ireland | 0 |
| Italy | 0 |
| Latvia | 0 |
| Lithuania | 0 |
| Luxembourg | 0 |
| Malta | 0 |
| Netherlands | 0 |
| Poland | 0 |
| Portugal | 0 |
| Romania | 0 |
| Slovakia | 0 |
| Slovenia | 0 |
| Spain | 0 |
| Sweden | 0 |
| Iceland | 0 |
| Liechtenstein | 0 |
| Norway | 0 |
Crisis and Elections Response
Elections 2024
[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].
Threats observed or anticipated
The campaign for the European Elections was organised in Croatia in part simultaneously with the campaign for the Croatian Parliament elections, so the context, actors and channels of communications were saturated with political pre-election content.
...
2024 Croatian Presidential Elections
The campaign for the Presidential Elections in Croatia intensified in early September and was at its peak in December as the first round was held on December 29, 2024, and the second round on January 12, 2025.
Although Faktograf was not approached by any platform to provide expertise relevant for risk analysis, mitigation and rapid response mechanisms in Croatia, we remain open to dialogue and engaging with all stakeholders.
Mitigations in place
In spring 2024 Faktograf focused its activities on providing trustworthy information and debunking misinformation and disinformation to citizens in Croatia. Additionally, Faktograf engaged in promoting digital media literacy and protecting its journalists from harassment, while also cooperating with fact-checkers in the country, region, EU and globally.
Faktograf was also approached by TikTok and started providing fact-checking services in the period before the elections.
Regarding the expected spread of deep fakes, Faktograf engaged in prebunking efforts such as Elections are approaching, and AI disinformation is becoming more and more convincing and The most common topics of disinformation before the EU elections were the war in Ukraine, followed by the climate, EU policies and migration.
This incident, as well as two other incidents against Faktograf’s journalist Melita Vrsaljko, were reported to the Mapping Media Freedom database, caused international reactions and contributed to deployment of an international mission to assess media freedom challenges in Croatia.
...
2024 Croatian Presidential Elections
During the preelection period, the election campaign and in its aftermath, Faktograf engaged in a set of activities:
Faktograf cooperated with TikTok’s Global Fact-checking Program and Meta’s third-party fact-checking program (exempting politicians).
4. cooperation within the Code of Practice Taskforce:
Having in mind the Commission Guidelines on the mitigation of systemic risks for electoral processes and the Rapid Response Mechanism of the Taskforce, Faktograf participated in the ad hoc working group on Croatian Presidential Elections working under a RRS-light mechanism. Faktograf shared two situational awareness reports announcing the campaign and own activities and informing on the results of fact-checking the controversial report from the Centre for Information Resilience on the eve of the election silence.
Faktograf participated in The Roundtable on Electoral Integrity organised by The Croatian Regulatory Authority for Network Industries (HAKOM) that was designated as the Coordinator for Digital Services in the Republic of Croatia.
Crisis 2024
[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].
Threats observed or anticipated
Mitigations in place