Microsoft Bing

Report September 2025

Submitted

Bing Search is one of the world’s leading online search engines with the primary objective of connecting users to the most relevant search results from the web

Integrity of Services

Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 16.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Bing participated in the Elections Working Group’s Rapid Response System and established additional intake channels to facilitate cross-platform information sharing in relation to elections in Germany, Romania, Portugal and Poland. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

We will continue to work to include data on potential foreign influence operations from teams across Microsoft to inform early detection and defensive search strategies for Bing search and Bing generative AI features. We also look forward to continuing to work on this commitment with the other signatories to further cross platform information sharing.

Measure 16.1

Relevant Signatories will share relevant information about cross-platform information manipulation, foreign interference in information space and incidents that emerge on their respective services for instance via a dedicated sub-group of the permanent Task-force or via existing fora for exchanging such information.

Although sharing of disinformation does not occur on the Bing platform (i.e., through the use of user accounts and networks), Bing supports cross-platform information sharing protocols established under this Measure. As a search engine, Bing may however have limited information to share with other platforms about cross-platform influence and foreign interference and therefore subscribes with the understanding that it principally participates as a recipient of information. 

QRE 16.1.1

Relevant Signatories will disclose the fora they use for information sharing as well as information about learnings derived from this sharing.

Bing Search is an online search engine, the primary purpose of which is to provide a searchable index of webpages available on the internet to help users find the content they are looking for. Bing Search does not host the content or control the operation, content, or design of indexed websites. Users come to Bing Search with a specific research topic in mind and expect Bing to provide links to the most relevant and authoritative third-party websites on the Internet that are responsive to their search terms. Bing Search does not allow users to post and share content or otherwise enable content to go “viral” through user-to-user exchanges of information on Bing. Although as a search engine Bing does not have any control over third party websites appearing in search results, Bing’s ranking algorithms, spam policies, and other safeguards described below can also address and mitigate the risks arising from malicious websites that use other TTPs attempting to manipulate our search engine rankings. 

Bing’s primary mechanism for combatting manipulative behaviors in search results is via its ranking algorithms and systems designed to identify and combat attempts to abuse search engine optimization techniques (i.e., spam). Bing Search describes the main parameters of its ranking systems in depth in How Bing Delivers Search Results. Abusive techniques and examples of prohibited SEO activities are described in more detail in the Bing Webmaster Guidelines. These pages provide a deeper, more detailed understanding of how Bing search algorithms work that cannot be fully detailed here given the space limitations of this report and complexity of how search engines rank websites.

As described in these documents, Bing’s ranking algorithms are designed to identify and prioritize high quality, highly authoritative content available online that is relevant to the user’s query and to prevent abusive search engine optimization techniques (spam). 

One of the key ranking techniques Bing uses to prevent low quality or misinformative websites from returning high in search results is through the “quality and credibility” score. Determining the quality and credibility (QC) of a website includes evaluating the clarity of purpose of the site, its usability, and presentation. QC also consists of an evaluation of the page’s “authority”, which includes factors such as:

  • Reputation: What types of other websites link to the site? A well-known news site is considered to have a higher reputation than a brand-new blog.
  • Level of discourse: Is the purpose of the content solely to cause harm to individuals or groups of people? For example, a site that promotes violence or resorts to name-calling or bullying will be considered to have a low level of discourse, and therefore lower authority, than a balanced news article.
  • Level of distortion: How well does the site differentiate fact from opinion? A site that is clearly labeled as satire or parody will have more authority than one that tries to obscure its intent.
  • Origination and transparency of the ownership: Is the site reporting first-hand information, or does it summarize or republish content from others? If the site doesn’t publish original content, do they attribute the source? A first-hand account published on a personal blog could have more authority than unsourced content.

In addition to its ranking algorithms, Bing Search’s general abuse/spam policies prohibit certain practices intended to manipulate or deceive the Bing Search algorithms. These policies include prohibitions intended to address the TTPs employed by malicious actors in the spread of disinformation. Pursuant to the Webmaster Guidelines, Bing may take action on websites employing spam tactics (such as social media schemes, keyword stuffing, malicious behavior, cloaking, link schemes, or misleading structured data markups) or that otherwise violate the Webmaster Guidelines, including by applying ranking penalties (such as demoting a website) or delisting a website from the index. 

Note that it is not feasible to distinguish between general spam tactics and spam tactics employed by malicious actors specifically for the purpose of spreading disinformation. Therefore, Bing Search has not presented data on the amount of spam detected and actioned under its policies since these figures are indicative of actions taken toward spam overall and presently cannot be used to provide an accurate assessment of whether it pertains to spam used in connection with disinformation campaigns or spam used for another purpose (e.g., phishing).  

Bing partners with numerous organizations, including independent third-party organizations and teams across Microsoft, to provide information on potential information operations that can be leveraged to inform early detection and defensive search strategies for Bing search and Bing generative AI features. For example,

  • Bing partners with independent third-party organizations, such as trusted fact checkers, news publishers, and research organizations, that provide fact checks, trustworthiness indicators, and early indicators of information operations, such as narratives or hashtags, to inform early detection and defensive search strategies. These organizations provide information for EEA member states, including in German, Polish, Romanian, and Portuguese languages, countries that had elections in the period.  Bing also utilizes the ClaimReview open protocol to ingest fact checks into search results.
  • Bing partners with Microsoft’s internal threat detection and research teams, including Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC), to collect and analyse data on actors of disinformation, misinformation and information manipulation across platforms. These teams collaborate with external organisations and companies to support Microsoft product and service teams effectively respond to issues and threats. Through MTAC and Microsoft’s Elections and Societal Resilience team, Microsoft also offers mediums for election authorities, including in the EEA Member States, to have lines of communication with Microsoft to identify possible foreign information operations targeting elections. 

SLI 16.1.1

Number of actions taken as a result of the collaboration and information sharing between signatories. Where they have such information, they will specify which Member States that were affected (including information about the content being detected and acted upon due to this collaboration).

Given the multipronged approach Microsoft and Bing take to monitoring and actioning influence operations and sources of misinformation and disinformation and the multiple internal and external sources relied upon, it is challenging to provide precise reporting on whether an incidence of single information sharing results in a corresponding defensive search intervention or other action.  

Empowering Users

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 18.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

No

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 18.2

Relevant Signatories will develop and enforce publicly documented, proportionate policies to limit the spread of harmful false or misleading information (as depends on the service, such as prohibiting, downranking, or not recommending harmful false or misleading information, adapted to the severity of the impacts and with due regard to freedom of expression and information); and take action on webpages or actors that persistently violate these policies.

QRE 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the policies or terms of service that are relevant to Measure 18.2 and on their approach towards persistent violations of these policies.

Unlike social media services, for which this Commitment appears primarily oriented, search engines do not typically cause or facilitate the viral propagation of disinformation, as they do not allow users to post or share content directly on the service. Please see How Bing delivers search results and Microsoft Bing Webmaster Guidelines for an overview of how Bing Search designs its algorithms to deliver high authority and highly relevant content while minimizing the negative impact of spam and less credible information sources. Bing Search’s ranking algorithms and related policies are intended to address deceptive tactics intended to manipulate the algorithms and are discussed in more detail at QREs 16.1.1. 

In addition, news and fact-check articles can appear in Bing News carousels, which are often presented at the top of search results pages, depending on the nature of user query. Microsoft maintains agreements with news publishers to surface high authority content, including articles from well-regarded fact checkers and research organizations covering EU/EEA, high in relevant search results.  

Bing’s suggestions features offer possible search queries to users to facilitate a more efficient search experience. While search suggestions are not directly tied to virality of content, Bing Search also undertakes measures to help ensure it does not inadvertently lead users to misleading or other harmful content through suggestions. Specifically, Bing Search uses a combination of proactive and reactive algorithmic and manual interventions to prevent the display of search suggestions that could lead to low authority content.  Users can also adjust and/or deactivate ancillary and supplemental search features, such as search suggestions.

Bing Search also provides a tool for users to provide feedback on suggestions they encounter. The feedback tool is shown below. 

[see pdf report page 19 for screenshot]

Clicking “Feedback on these suggestions” allows users to provide specific feedback on individual suggestions on the below bases:

[see pdf report  page 19 for screenshot]

In Bing’s generative AI experiences, there is generally no risk of viral spread of generated content through Bing because Bing does not allow users to directly post or otherwise share content on the platform. However, Bing has taken steps to prevent the service from being used to create misinformation that might be shared on other platforms through a multipronged approach to mitigations that helps prevent users from creating misinformative content. This system includes terms of use and a code of conduct, classifiers, filters, metaprompting, and robust reporting mechanisms designed to mitigate the risk of potential misuse of the platform. The terms governing usage Bing Image Creator and Bing Image Creator, for example, prohibit users from using the service to generate fraudulent or misleading information, including the creation of disinformation. Bing’s ranking and relevance systems for search, which are an essential component to answering user questions in Copilot Search, work to ensure that high authority content is returned first in search results.  Where Copilot Search systems flag that a user’s prompt or generated output may result in low authority or misleading information, the system will take steps to mitigate that possible harm through solutions, such as not returning generated content to the user, diverting the user to a different topic, or redirecting the user to traditional search. Users who encounter problematic content can report concerns at Microsoft-Report a Concern. 

SLI 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken in response to violations of policies relevant to Measure 18.2, at the Member State level. The metrics shall include: Total number of violations and Meaningful metrics to measure the impact of these actions (such as their impact on the visibility of or the engagement with content that was actioned upon).

Bing Search does not have data relevant to this SLI. Users come to Bing Search with a specific research topic in mind and expect Bing Search to provide links to the most relevant and authoritative third-party websites on the Internet that are responsive to their search terms. Bing Search does not have a news feed for users of user content, allow users to post and share content within Bing, or otherwise enable content to go “viral” on Bing. 

Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 19.1 Measure 19.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

No

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

No

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 19.1

Relevant Signatories will make available to their users, including through the Transparency Centre and in their terms and conditions, in a clear, accessible and easily comprehensible manner, information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ.

QRE 19.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard. This information should also be included in the Transparency Centre.

Bing’s search engine ranking algorithms are not a traditional “recommender system” in that Bing Search only provides content to users as a result of their express request, rather than pushing content to users who were not expressly seeking it. That said, the main parameters of Bing Search’s ranking algorithms are published in the “How Bing Ranks Search Results” section of How Bing Delivers Search, which is available to Bing Search users in the EU. Bing Search also provides information on how it ranks and returns search suggestions in the Enhanced Search Experiences section of How Bing Delivers Search Results. Ancillary and supplemental search features, such as search suggestions, can be adjusted and/or deactivated through user search settings. Bing’s ranking algorithms apply equally to traditional search results and generative AI features that extend to Bing. 

Please also see 22.2.1. 

Measure 19.2

Relevant Signatories will provide options for the recipients of the service to select and to modify at any time their preferred options for relevant recommender systems, including giving users transparency about those options.

N/A

Commitment 20

Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 20.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Microsoft has continued to improve content provenance measures on its AI image and video generation features, including Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator.

As part of Microsoft’s commitments to combat deceptive AI, Microsoft is building on its 2024 Tech Accord work:

  • Developing and implementing technology to mitigate risks related to Deceptive AI Election content, including open-source tools where appropriate
  • Assessing models in scope to understand the risks they may present regarding Deceptive AI Election Content
  • Seeking to detect the distribution of this content on their platforms
  • Seeking to appropriately address this content detected on their platforms
  • Providing transparency to the public regarding how the company addresses it
  • Continuing to engage with a diverse set of global civil society organizations, academics
  • Supporting efforts to foster public awareness, media literacy, and all-of-society resilience.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Microsoft expects to continue its important work in content provenance tools and ways to help counter harmful AI-generated content. Microsoft is helping to build public trust in digital content through its leadership in the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA). A multistakeholder initiative, we are partnering with civil society organizations and industry partners in developing technical standards to certify the origin and integrity of media. These standards are being integrated into Microsoft’s AI-generated image services, such as Microsoft Designer, and are helping partners verify if image content was created using AI.

Measure 20.2

Relevant Signatories will take steps to join/support global initiatives and standards bodies (for instance, C2PA) focused on the development of provenance tools.

QRE 20.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of global initiatives and standards bodies focused on the development of provenance tools (for instance, C2PA) that signatories have joined, or the support given to relevant organisations, providing links to organisation websites where possible.

Microsoft is helping to build public trust in digital content through its leadership in the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (C2PA). A multistakeholder initiative, we are partnering with civil society organizations and industry partners in developing technical standards to certify the origin and integrity of media. These standards are being integrated into Microsoft’s AI-generated image services, such as Microsoft Designer, and are helping partners verify that their content has not been manipulated by AI. if image content was created using AI. 

Commitment 22

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with tools to help them make more informed decisions when they encounter online information that may be false or misleading, and to facilitate user access to tools and information to assess the trustworthiness of information sources, such as indicators of trustworthiness for informed online navigation, particularly relating to societal issues or debates of general interest.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 22.2 Measure 22.3 Measure 22.7

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Microsoft has been working with The Lenfest Institute to develop AI solutions for local news. Those solutions will be readily available for sharing across the industry, and the first case studies will be released in September. Through the Online News Association, The Poynter Institute, Thomson Reuters Foundation and Impress UK, Microsoft and its partners have trained more than 10,000 journalists on AI policy setting and ethical use cases for AI in news.

Microsoft continued work with the human rights-focused nonprofit WITNESS to enhance journalists’ and fact-checkers’ capacity to address AI threats to elections. As part of their collaboration with Microsoft, they have created resources to build literacy around AI detection and how this technology compliments core information literacy approaches, which was debuted to global audiences at the International Journalism Festival in Perugia, Italy in April 2025. The resource can be found here: Things to know before using AI detection tools - Library

Microsoft also supported and collaborated on the development and release of The Newsroom Toolkit from the Poynter Institute’s MediaWise. The toolkit is a resource for journalists and media professionals seeking to integrate AI literacy into their reporting and organizational practices. Poynter reported that the release of the toolkit was met with high interest and enthusiasm by industry professionals with 431 individuals attending the webinar launch from 50 countries, including European Union Countries and 1,857 toolkit downloads in the first three months after release. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Bing regularly evaluates opportunities to improve its product and educate users on the trustworthiness and limitations of AI. Using our existing work with Minecraft Microsoft will be rolling out educational materials for users around AI and AI literacy to continue to support our users need for ongoing engagement and education. In addition, Microsoft will have updated education materials to engage learners. Go here for more: https://techcommunity.microsoft.com/blog/educationblog/empowering-learners-for-the-age-of-ai-new-information-literacy-features-coming-t/4443052

Measure 22.2

Relevant Signatories will give users the option of having signals relating to the trustworthiness of media sources into the recommender systems or feed such signals into their recommender systems.

QRE 22.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on whether and, if relevant, how they feed signals related to the trustworthiness of media sources into their recommender systems, and outline the rationale for their approach.

Bing Search utilizes a variety of signals – including trustworthiness indicators from trusted fact checkers and research organizations – as one of several means to help determine the authority score of a given website and rank it accordingly in search results. 

Microsoft also maintains additional partnerships with fact checkers and research organizations covering EU/EEA to strengthen the company’s capacity and understanding of global threats to disinformation and inform interventions in Bing search to protect users against related risks. These partnerships are part of a broader effort to empower Microsoft users to better understand the information they consume across our platforms and products.  

The above mechanisms and the Bing algorithm’s emphasis on promoting high authority content are applied equally to Bing generative AI features to help ensure that users are protected from misleading information across Bing surfaces. Ancillary and supplemental search features, such as search suggestions, can be adjusted and/or deactivated through user search setting. 

Measure 22.3

Relevant Signatories will make details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard. This information should also be included in the Transparency Centre.

QRE 22.3.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard. This information should also be included in the Transparency Centre.

The above-mentioned policies and measures are available to EU users in EU languages through the Microsoft Bing Webmaster Guidelines and How Bing delivers search results. 

Measure 22.7

Relevant Signatories will design and apply products and features (e.g. information panels, banners, pop-ups, maps and prompts, trustworthiness indicators) that lead users to authoritative sources on topics of particular public and societal interest or in crisis situations.

QRE 22.7.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the products and features they deploy across their services and will specify whether those are available across Member States.

In addition to broader measures described in this report, Bing Search has taken special care to counter low authority information and misinformation in relation to elections, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Israel-Hamas conflict, and EU Member State elections as detailed below and further in the Crisis and Elections Reporting appendices. 

Microsoft is an active participant in the Task-force’s Crisis Response Subgroup and Elections Working Group. In addition, Microsoft works with election authorities responsible for running elections to promote trusted information regarding elections and monitors for foreign information operations targeting elections. 

Bing has launched temporary special features such as info panels and specialized answers directing users to high authority content concerning elections and voting (see below example for German federal election in reporting period). 

[see screenshot on page 27 in pdf report]

Additional detail is provided in the Crisis Reporting appendix.

In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Bing Search has closely monitored low authority information trend and works to promote authoritative content related to the conflict.

  • Bing Search has taken steps to algorithmically boost authority signals and has downgraded less authoritative information (see SLI 22.7.1). These queries are translated automatically into other languages supported by Bing Search and integrated into Copilot Search
  • Bing search works with Microsoft’s Elections and Societal Resilience Team and Threat Assessment Center (MTAC) to ensure access to signals regarding Russian cyber and information operations targeting Ukraine to inform potential algorithmic interventions both for traditional and generative AI search tools.
  • Bing Search partners with independent third-party organizations, including trusted fact checkers, news publishers, research organizations and nonprofit organizations, to provide information related to information operations, such as actors, domains, narratives, and emerging data voids manipulated, to inform potential algorithmic interventions both for traditional and Bing’s generative AI experiences.
  • Bing Search also takes action to remove autosuggest and related search terms that have been found likely to lead users to low authority content.  
  • These measures have helped ensure that Bing Search is generally promoting authoritative news sources, timelines, and other factual information at the top of algorithmic search results and in Copilot Search.

Additional information concerning the Israel-Hamas conflict is contained in the Crisis Reporting Appendices. 

SLI 22.7.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the reach and/or user interactions with the products or features, at the Member State level, via the metrics of impressions and interactions (clicks, click-through rates (as relevant to the tools and services in question) and shares (as relevant to the tools and services in question).

Bing has revised the SLI action descriptions below for accuracy with respect to the metrics provided pursuant to this Section. Please see below key metrics.

Although defensive search actions are taken at a global level (and therefore applied in every Member State), Bing has endeavoured to provide the additional following data for this SLI: 

  • “Defensive Interventions (RU/UA)” refers to the total number of queries entered by users that were addressed with defensive search interventions related to the Ukraine/Russia crisis during the Reporting Period.
  • “Impressions (RU/UA)” reflects the number of user impressions for queries searched by users where defensive search interventions related to the Ukraine/Russia crisis were applied during the Reporting Period. 

Country Defensive Interventions (RU/UA) Impressions (RU/UA)
Austria 1384 30148
Belgium 2344 36194
Bulgaria - -
Croatia - -
Cyprus - -
Czech Republic - -
Denmark 827 4576
Estonia - -
Finland 695 5360
France 3658 123361
Germany 7695 293389
Greece - -
Hungary - -
Ireland 3182 29989
Italy 2534 44081
Latvia - -
Lithuania 1 1
Luxembourg - -
Malta - -
Netherlands 3320 22938
Poland 2293 12330
Portugal 1177 7772
Romania 2 3
Slovakia - -
Slovenia - -
Spain 2779 30566
Sweden 2851 12768
Iceland - -
Liechtenstein - -
Norway 1951 10859
EU 34742 654196
EEA 36693 665055
Global 763081 6192957

Empowering Researchers

Commitment 26

Relevant Signatories commit to provide access, wherever safe and practicable, to continuous, real-time or near real-time, searchable stable access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated, or manifestly-made public data for research purposes on Disinformation through automated means such as APIs or other open and accessible technical solutions allowing the analysis of said data.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 26.1 Measure 26.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

No

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Bing is dedicated to supporting the research community and welcomes feedback from this vital community and the Commission on the types of data that would be most useful for safety research. 

Measure 26.1

Relevant Signatories will provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated or manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation on their services, such as engagement and impressions (views) of content hosted by their services, with reasonable safeguards to address risks of abuse (e.g. API policies prohibiting malicious or commercial uses).

QRE 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the tools and processes in place to provide public access to non-personal data and anonymised, aggregated and manifestly-made public data pertinent to undertaking research on Disinformation, as well as the safeguards in place to address risks of abuse.

Bing Search and Microsoft are dedicated to supporting the research community and regularly provide information and data to the research community in a variety of ways.

Bing Search also offers use of Bing APIs to the public, which include Bing Image Search, Bing News Search, Bing Video Search, Bing Visual Search, Bing Web Search, Bing Entity Search, Bing Autosuggest, and Bing Spell Check. Bing Search provides free access to these APIs for up to 1,000 transactions per month, which may be leveraged by the research community. 

Researchers who are registered webmasters may utilize Bing Search’s Keyword Tools and Backlinks Webmaster Tools to provide insights into search usage and keywords. Bing is also working on ways to provide deeper research access to the tool across the research community and hopes to provide updates in its next report.

Microsoft maintains a public portal of codes, APIs, software development kits, and datasets that are available to the Research Community at Researcher tools: code & datasets - Microsoft Research. These public research tools can be accessed by researchers and downloaded instantaneously without formal applications or login credentials. 

Microsoft is also a leader in Responsible AI and offers and offers a range of tools and resources to promote responsible usage of artificial intelligence. Information on Microsoft’s tools, practices, and policies to uphold its responsible AI principles can be found at Responsible AI: Ethical policies and practices | Microsoft AI.

Bing operates its Qualified Researcher Program in alignment with the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA), Article 40(12), to enable EU researchers to easily request access for publicly accessible Bing data from a singular landing page.  However, because these datasets are already available open-source (see above), some researchers may elect to obtain datasets via the above means to avoid the burden of an application and credentialing process.

Bing has engaged with European researchers on eligible requests under the Bing Qualified Researcher program such as search data on local elections based on the types of data that will be most useful to the research community. Through this program, Bing has shared data with researchers from different European countries.

Lastly, given the open nature of the Bing Search index and public nature of search results, researchers can utilize Bing Search, Copilot Search, Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator to run specific queries and analyze results (unlike social media which may require private accounts or connections between users to access certain materials). 

QRE 26.1.2

Relevant Signatories will publish information related to data points available via Measure 25.1, as well as details regarding the technical protocols to be used to access these data points, in the relevant help centre. This information should also be reachable from the Transparency Centre. At minimum, this information will include definitions of the data points available, technical and methodological information about how they were created, and information about the representativeness of the data.

Bing published information on its Qualified Researcher Program at Bing Qualified Researcher Program - Microsoft Support. Bing will publish additional information as it becomes available. 

SLI 26.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide quantitative information on the uptake of the tools and processes described in Measure 26.1, such as number of users.

Bing has a tracking tool for all the data requests by researchers in alignment with the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA), Article 40(12). The tool includes the information on the researcher, received and response dates, link to application, provided answer and rational amongst other information. 

Nr of data requests from qualified researchers: 2

Measure 26.3

Relevant Signatories will implement procedures for reporting the malfunctioning of access systems and for restoring access and repairing faulty functionalities in a reasonable time.

QRE 26.3.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the reporting procedures in place to comply with Measure 26.3 and provide information about their malfunction response procedure, as well as about malfunctions that would have prevented the use of the systems described above during the reporting period and how long it took to remediate them.

For Bing Search’s Keyword Research tool, users can report issues by creating a support request ticket at Webmaster Support - Bing Webmaster Tools.

For Bing API access, users can report issues at https://aka.ms/bingapisupport.

 For Bing’s EU qualified researcher program, users can find information to report issues at Bing Qualified Researcher Program - Microsoft Support

Commitment 28

COOPERATION WITH RESEARCHERS Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 28.2 Measure 28.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Bing and Microsoft have initiated new research projects and undertaken internal research on misinformation risks in image generation services, generative AI in elections, and other important topics.

Starting in June of 2025 Microsoft launched our AI Election Management Body Accelerator program. Since then, this program has reached election leaders around the world, delivering hands-on training at major events like International IDEA workshops. In a few short months, we’ve engaged over 1,400 participants representing 60+ countries through in-person and virtual workshops, panels, and webinars—demonstrating the breadth and impact of our commitment to supporting election offices at every level. This included a workshop co-hosted by International IDEA and the Swedish election authority in Stockholm in June that was attended by election authorities from Belgium, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greenland, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, UK.  

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Ongoing review of researcher feedback and requests may result in additional measures and resources.

In addition, Microsoft Research regularly explores potential partnerships with third party research institutions and is actively in discussions with several research institutions on potential misinformation and disinformation related research that may leverage Bing Search data. Microsoft’s internal research divisions also regularly initiate and support research relevant to misinformation and disinformation and further research may be released in the next reporting period.

Measure 28.2

Relevant Signatories will be transparent on the data types they currently make available to researchers across Europe.

QRE 28.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe what data types European researchers can currently access via their APIs or via dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

See QRE 26.1.1. 

Measure 28.3

Relevant Signatories will not prohibit or discourage genuinely and demonstratively public interest good faith research into Disinformation on their platforms, and will not take adversarial action against researcher users or accounts that undertake or participate in good-faith research into Disinformation.

QRE 28.3.1

Relevant Signatories will collaborate with EDMO to run an annual consultation of European researchers to assess whether they have experienced adversarial actions or are otherwise prohibited or discouraged to run such research.

We look forward to partnering with other relevant signatories on this project and will provide further reporting as the annual consultation is established. 

Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 34.1 Measure 34.2 Measure 34.3 Measure 34.4 Measure 34.5

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Microsoft Bing has actively contributed in the Transparency Center subgroup, providing feedback on the functioning and usability of the Transparency Center website. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Microsoft Bing is committed to the proper functioning of the Transparency Center website and will therefore continue its engagement in the Transparency Center subgroup in order to assess the necessity of technical adjustments and new actions to improve the website. 

Commitment 35

Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 35.1 Measure 35.2 Measure 35.3 Measure 35.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Microsoft Bing will upload its September 2025 Report to the Transparency Centre website in a timely manner, which includes clear and simple information on the new or existing policies and actions that each service has implemented based on our Subscription document. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Within the context of the work of the Transparency Center subgroup, Microsoft Bing will assess the necessity of technical adjustments and contribute to actions where necessary, aiming to make the website more user-friendly and easily accessible for users ahead of the next reporting period. 

Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 37.1 Measure 37.2 Measure 37.4 Measure 37.5 Measure 37.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Microsoft Bing has actively engaged in and contributed to the work of the Task-force and the Subgroups and Working Groups that took place during the reporting period. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Microsoft Bing is committed to continuing its active engagement in and contribution to the Task-force and relevant Subgroups and Working Groups in the upcoming six-month period. 

Measure 37.6

Signatories agree to notify the rest of the Task-force when a Commitment or Measure would benefit from changes over time as their practices and approaches evolve, in view of technological, societal, market, and legislative developments. Having discussed the changes required, the Relevant Signatories will update their subscription document accordingly and report on the changes in their next report.

QRE 37.6.1

Signatories will describe how they engage in the work of the Task-force in the reporting period, including the sub-groups they engaged with.

Microsoft Bing has actively engaged in and contributed to all the Task-force Plenary meetings as well as to the meetings of all Subgroups and Working Groups relevant to its subscription that were active in the current reporting cycle. As part of each Subgroup and Working Group relevant to its subscription that has taken place during the reporting period, Microsoft Bing has actively contributed to the development of the deliverables that were collectively agreed. 

Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 38.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

A dedicated team within Microsoft Bing continues to ensure proper tracking and compliance with the Code of Practice across all applicable geographical areas, consisting of relevant product attorneys, as well as members of the European Government Affairs team and Elections and Societal Resilience Team. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Microsoft Bing will continue its efforts to ensure continued progress towards compliance of relevant measures. 

Measure 38.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

QRE 38.1.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

Microsoft Bing implemented a dedicated team to ensure proper tracking and compliance with the Code of Practice across all applicable geographical areas, consisting of relevant product attorneys, as well as members of the European Government Affairs team and Elections and Societal Resilience Team. In addition, we implemented an internal tracking process that captured all relevant commitments, responsible entity and persons responsible for compliance with the Code of Practice. Moreover, regular review of new product features take place to assess potential impacts and compliance under the Code. 

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code’s Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 40.1 Measure 40.3 Measure 40.4 Measure 40.5 Measure 40.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

This Report sets out in detail the measures that Microsoft Bing has taken in view of the regular reporting that they have subscribed to under the Code of Practice. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Microsoft Bing has worked over the past months to ensure it is in a position for the delivery of the September 2025 Report and looks forward to further expanding and deepening its implementation work ahead of the next reporting cycle. 

Commitment 42

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes 

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Microsoft Bing has been an active participant in and contributor to the Task-force’s Elections Working Group, working with signatories to finalize the Elections Rapid Response System, which has subsequently been implemented in our internal workflows. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Microsoft Bing looks forward to continuing the cooperation between Signatories in the context of the Task-force’s Crisis Response Subgroup and Elections Working Group. 

Commitment 43

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Taskforce.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Microsoft Bing will provide its September 2025 Report in accordance with the revised Harmonised Reporting Template and underlying methodologies as jointly developed by Signatories in the Monitoring and Reporting Subgroup under the Code’s Task-force. 

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Microsoft Bing will continue its active engagement in the respective Task-force Subgroups to update where necessary the Harmonised Reporting Template and underlying methodologies in view of its experience with reporting. 

Crisis and Elections Response

Elections 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

Bing Search anticipated instances of information manipulation with possible actor intent to manipulate search algorithms and lead users to data voids and low-authority content related to elections. As part of its regular information integrity operations, Bing detected information manipulation themes related to the German national election, which have been ingested to inform defensive search interventions. 

Mitigations in place

Bing Search takes a multifaceted approach to protecting election integrity and regularly updates its processes, policies, and practices to adapt to evolving risks, trends, and technological innovations. This approach includes: (1) defensive search interventions; (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources; (3) removal of auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content; (4) partnerships with independent organizations  for threat intelligence on information manipulation, civic integrity and nation state affiliated actors to  inform potential algorithmic interventions and contribute to broader research community; (5) special information panels and answers to direct users to high authority sources concerning elections and voting; (6) internal working groups dedicated to addressing company-wide election initiatives; (7) establishing special election-focused product feature teams; (8) conducting internal research on content provenance and elections; (9) evaluating and undertaking red-team testing for generative AI features with respect to elections; (10) ensuring Responsible AI reviews for all AI features; (11) undertaking comprehensive risk assessments related to elections and electoral processes; (12) developing and continuing to improve targeted monitoring both for web search and Bing generative AI features; (13) restricting generative AI responses for certain types of election-related content; (14) leveraging blocklists and classifiers in generative AI experiences to restrict generation of images or certain types of content concerning politicians and certain election-related topics (15) integrating information on political parties, candidates, and elections from local election authorities (including in the EU) or high authority third party sources to inform defensive interventions and election-related product mitigations; and (16) regularly evaluating whether additional measures, metrics, or mitigations should be implemented. These measures are integrated into Bing Search, Copilot Search, and Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report.

In addition, we offer AccountGuard which is Microsoft’s advanced security program designed to protect organizations involved in democratic processes and civil society. The program provides monitoring, threat detection, and rapid response services.. AccountGuard is available in 23 European Union countries - including Belgium, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden - and is also accessible to candidates for the EU Parliament from any member nation.

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 50.1.1

Authoritative Information sources 

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 50.1.2

Bing Search empowered voters with authoritative election information on Bing. We do this in partnership with organizations that provide information on authoritative sources, ensuring that queries about election administration will surface reputable sites 

Policy - 50.1.4

Authoritative Information sources 

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 50.1.5

In advance of the German federal election, Bing launched a special “How to Vote” information. Answer to show high authority information related to the election for users, localized by language. Bing Search directed users to official source from the Federal Returning Officer on select information seeking queries related to this election. 

Rationale - 50.1.6

Policy - 50.1.7

Deepfakes and Elections 

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 50.1.8

Microsoft-2024 Elections is a webpage created to empower political candidates and campaigns to report alleged deepfakes of themselves to Microsoft. To date, we have not received an actionable report of deceptive AI targeting elections on Microsoft platforms.

Microsoft’s Office of Responsible AI has also established policies concerning election-related content and works with teams, including Bing, Copilot Search, Tech for Society and Bing Image Creator and Bing Video Creator on implementation. 

Rationale - 50.1.9

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 50.4.2

In advance of the German national election, Bing launched a special “How to Vote” information Answer to show high authority information related to the election for users in Germany, localized by language. Bing Search directed users to official source from the Ministry of Interior on select information seeking queries related to this election.

Bing has identified information manipulation themes related to the German national election, which have informed defensive search interventions and fanouts to related search terms.

Indication of impact - 50.4.3

The “How to Vote” answer for the German national election was clicked 22.5k times globally, resulting in 151K impressions globally.

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 50.5.2

Bing Search empowers voters with authoritative election information on Bing. We do this in partnership with organizations that provide information on authoritative sources, ensuring that queries about election administration will surface reputable sites. Additionally, Bing receives data from independent third party organizations, election authorities and other sources of trusted election information to ensure accurate election critical information is provided to voters. In addition, Bing works to provide user-facing information panels on election information for major European elections. 

Indication of impact - 50.5.3

The “How to Vote” answer for the German national election was clicked 22.5k times globally, resulting in 151K impressions globally.

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 50.6.2

Microsoft is undertaking additional research on how users interact with content provenance tools and the use of content provenance tools for AI and elections and other research concerning AI and elections.  

Indication of impact - 50.6.3

Such research helps to inform Bing safety mitigations. 

Crisis 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Bing Search has observed instances of information manipulation with possible actor intent to manipulate search algorithms and lead users to data voids and low-authority content related to the Russia<>Ukraine conflict. Themes included narratives involving Ukrainian immigrants in different countries, specific countries’ support to Ukraine (often in the context of local elections), allegations surrounding Ukrainian politicians, military operations such as third parties' potential involvement in the war, etc.

Israel – Hamas conflict

Bing Search has observed instances of data void manipulation to show low-authority content to unsuspecting users related to the Israel-Hamas conflict. This type of search algorithm manipulation could potentially be used as a tactic to spread disinformation. Other themes observed have included foreign influence operations speculating on the evolution of conflict and military operations in the area, often referring to manipulated videos and images circulating online and narratives on the broader Middle East conflicts. 

Mitigations in place

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Microsoft has been actively involved in identifying and helping counter Russia’s cyber and influence operations aimed against Ukraine. In addition to supporting nonprofits, journalists, and academics within Ukraine, Microsoft’s Threat Analysis Center (MTAC) team closely tracks cyber-enabled influence operations. MTAC’s work includes analysing the ways these methods are leveraged to target audiences in Central and Eastern Europe. 

Bing Search has implemented the following measures: (1) Defensive search interventions (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources as part of search algorithms; (3) remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content as part of moderation; (4) authority demotion of identified nation state affiliated information manipulation actor domains and (5) partnerships with independent organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. These measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI features , along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report. 

Israel – Hamas conflict

As part of its regular practices, Bing search employs (1) Defensive search interventions (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources as part of search algorithms; (3) remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content as part of moderation; (4) authority demotion of identified nation state affiliated information manipulation actor domains and (5) partnerships with independent organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. These measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI features, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report.

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Bing has not implemented additional policies specific to this crisis since its last report.

Israel – Hamas conflict 
Bing Search has not introduced specific policies related to this crisis, as it considers existing measures discussed throughout this report to sufficiently mitigate risks related to this crisis. 

Rationale - 51.1.3

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Prior to this reporting period, Bing had already established measures to address this crisis. Although Bing continues to refine its approach to addressing this crisis and continues to evolve mitigation measures, it has not introduced specific policy changes this reporting period.  

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.4.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Bing Search has implemented the following measures: 

(1) Defensive search interventions (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources as part of search algorithms; (3) remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content as part of moderation; (4) authority demotion of identified nation state affiliated information manipulation actor domains and (5) partnerships with independent organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. These measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI features, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report. 

Israel – Hamas conflict

Bing Search has not introduced specific practices or policies related to this crisis, as it considers existing measures discussed throughout this report to sufficiently mitigate risks. However, Bing continues to monitor this crisis and may evolve its approach as needed.

As part of its regular practices, Bing Search employs (1) Defensive search interventions (2) regular direction of users to high authority, high quality sources as part of search algorithms; (3) remove auto suggest and related search terms considered likely to lead users to low authority content as part of moderation; (4) authority demotion of identified nation state affiliated information manipulation actor domains and (5) partnerships with independent organizations to maintain threat intelligence and inform potential algorithmic interventions. These measures are also integrated into Bing generative AI features, along with the additional safeguards discussed throughout this report. 

Indication of impact - 51.4.3

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
More than 763,081 queries searched by users in the globally related to the Russia/Ukraine conflict have been treated with defensive search interventions, resulting in over 6,192,957 impressions. For member state level reporting, see SLI 22.7.1.
 
Israel – Hamas conflict
N/A

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.5.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

Articles from news and fact checking organizations, may also appear as part of specialized Bing Answers. In addition, news and fact-check articles can appear in Bing News carousels, which are often presented at the top of search results pages, depending on the nature of user query. Microsoft maintains agreements with news publishers to surface high authority content, including articles from well-regarded fact checking organizations and journalist-driven fact-checks, high in relevant search results.  

In addition, Bing utilizes information, including fact checks, trustworthiness indicators, and narratives, to inform the Bing algorithm and defensive search measures that power Bing search and Bing generative AI features. Bing works with independent third-party organizations to provide early indicators of narratives, hashtags, or information operations that can be leveraged to inform early detection and defensive search strategies for Bing (including in EEA member states including German, Polish, Romanian, Portuguese languages, countries that had elections in the period).  Bing also utilizes the ClaimReview open protocol to ingest fact checks into search results.

Israel – Hamas conflict

Bing Search has not introduced specific practices or policies related to this crisis, as it considers existing measures discussed throughout this report to sufficiently mitigate risks. However, Bing continues to monitor this crisis and may evolve its approach as needed.

Nonetheless, articles from news and fact checking organizations may also appear as part of specialized Bing Answers. In addition, news and fact-check articles can appear in Bing News carousels, which are often presented at the top of search results pages, depending on the nature of user query. Microsoft maintains agreements with news publishers to surface high authority content, including articles from well-regarded fact checkers and research organizations covering EU/EEA, high in relevant search results.  

Bing partners with numerous organizations, including independent third-party organizations and teams across Microsoft, to provide information on potential information operations that can be leveraged to inform early detection and defensive search strategies for Bing search and Bing generative AI features. For example,

  • Bing partners with independent third-party organizations, such as trusted fact checkers, news publishers, and research organizations, that provide fact checks, trustworthiness indicators, and early indicators of information operations, such as narratives or hashtags, to inform early detection and defensive search strategies. These organizations provide information for EEA member states, including in German, Polish, Romanian, and Portuguese languages, countries that had elections in the period.  Bing also utilizes the ClaimReview open protocol to ingest fact checks into search results.
  • Bing partners with Microsoft’s internal threat detection and research teams, including Microsoft Threat Analysis Center (MTAC), to collect and analyse data on actors of disinformation, misinformation and information manipulation across platforms. These teams collaborate with external organisations and companies to support Microsoft product and service teams effectively respond to issues and threats. Through MTAC and Microsoft’s Elections and Societal Resilience team, Microsoft also offers mediums for election authorities, including in the EEA Member States, to have lines of communication with Microsoft to identify possible foreign information operations targeting elections. 

Indication of impact - 51.5.3

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

See QRE 22.7.1 for further information. 

Israel – Hamas conflict

N/A

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.6.5

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine

See QRE 26.1.1 for general research support. Bing Search has not made datasets available pertaining specifically to this crisis. 

Israel – Hamas conflict

See QRE 26.1.1 for general research support. Bing Search has not made datasets available pertaining specifically to this crisis. 

Indication of impact - 51.6.6

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
N/A

Israel – Hamas conflict
N/A