Report September 2025

Submitted

Your organisation description

Advertising

Commitment 1

Relevant signatories participating in ad placements commit to defund the dissemination of disinformation, and improve the policies and systems which determine the eligibility of content to be monetised, the controls for monetisation and ad placement, and the data to report on the accuracy and effectiveness of controls and services around ad placements.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 1.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

LinkedIn plans to continue to assess its policies and services and to update them as warranted.

Measure 1.3

Relevant Signatories responsible for the selling of advertising, inclusive of publishers, media platforms, and ad tech companies, will take commercial and technically feasible steps, including support for relevant third-party approaches, to give advertising buyers transparency on the placement of their advertising.

QRE 1.3.1

Signatories will report on the controls and transparency they provide to advertising buyers with regards to the placement of their ads as it relates to Measure 1.3.

LinkedIn provides a range of information and tools to give advertisers transparency and control regarding the placement of their advertising. For example, LinkedIn publishes for the public and advertisers a semiannual transparency report pursuant the DSA, which discloses metrics regarding the amount of violating member content, including misinformation, that LinkedIn removed from the platform during the period. For the period from 1 July to 31 December 2024, for example, LinkedIn removed 12,100 pieces of DSA-relevant content as misinformation under own initiative moderation. LinkedIn’s most recent DSA transparency report is available here.

For ads on the LinkedIn Audience Network, as discussed in QRE 1.2.1, LinkedIn provides tools to assist advertisers in controlling where their ads appear within the network. For example, advertisers can set up category-level blocking based on the Interactive Advertising Bureau’s (IAB) publisher category taxonomy to prevent their ads from running on certain types of publishers within the network. Similarly, advertisers can review the list of publishers within the network and create custom allow lists and block lists to ensure their ads are placed on apps and sites that meet an advertiser’s specific standards.

Commitment 2

Relevant Signatories participating in advertising commit to prevent the misuse of advertising systems to disseminate Disinformation in the form of advertising messages.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 2.1 Measure 2.3 Measure 2.4

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

LinkedIn plans to continue to assess its policies and services and to update them as warranted.

Measure 2.1

Relevant Signatories will develop, deploy, and enforce appropriate and tailored advertising policies that address the misuse of their advertising systems for propagating harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.

QRE 2.1.1

Signatories will disclose and outline the policies they develop, deploy, and enforce to meet the goals of Measure 2.1 and will link to relevant public pages in their help centres.

LinkedIn prohibits misinformation and disinformation on its platform, whether in the form of organic content or in the form of advertising content. LinkedIn’s Professional Community Policies, which apply to all content on the platform, expressly prohibit false and misleading content, including misinformation and disinformation:

Do not share false or misleading content: Do not share content that is false, misleading, or intended to deceive. Do not share content to interfere with or improperly influence an election or other civic process. Do not share synthetic or manipulated media that depicts a person saying something they did not say or doing something they did not do without clearly disclosing the fake or altered nature of the material. Do not share content that directly contradicts guidance from leading global health organisations and public health authorities; including false information about the safety or efficacy of vaccines or medical treatments. Do not share content or endorse someone or something in exchange for personal benefit (including personal or family relationships, monetary payment, free products or services, or other value), unless you have included a clear and conspicuous notice of the personal benefit you receive and have otherwise complied with our Advertising Policies.

LinkedIn provides specific examples of false and misleading content that violates its policy via a Help Center article on False or Misleading Content.

LinkedIn’s Advertising Policies incorporate the Professional Community Policies provision, and similarly prohibit misinformation and disinformation. In addition, LinkedIn’s Advertising Policies separately prohibit fraudulent and deceptive ads, and require that claims in an ad have factual support:

Fraud and Deception: Ads must not be fraudulent or deceptive. Your product or service must accurately match the content of your ad. Any claims in your ad must have factual support. Do not make deceptive or inaccurate claims about competitive products or services. Do not imply you or your product are affiliated with or endorsed by others without their permission. Additionally, make sure to disclose any pertinent partnerships when sharing advertising content on LinkedIn. Do not advertise prices or offers that are inaccurate – any advertised discount, offer or price must be easily discoverable from the link in your ad.

SLI 2.1.1

Signatories will report, quantitatively, on actions they took to enforce each of the policies mentioned in the qualitative part of this service level indicator, at the Member State or language level. This could include, for instance, actions to remove, to block, or to otherwise restrict harmful Disinformation in advertising messages and in the promotion of content.

The table below reports the number of ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1 above between 1 January – 30 June 2025, broken out by EEA Member State.

The metrics are assigned to EEA Member State based on the primary country targeting of the ad.

The following factors may contribute to the number of ads reported by LinkedIn being low:

LinkedIn is primarily a business-to-business advertising platform - that is, businesses marketing their products and services to other businesses and members in a professional capacity.
Because of the business-to-business nature of LinkedIn’s advertising platform, ads on LinkedIn may cost more than ads placed in other settings, impacting the ads run on LinkedIn.

Country	The number of ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1 between 1 January - 30 June 2025
Austria	0
Belgium	0
Bulgaria	0
Croatia	0
Cyprus	0
Czech Republic	0
Denmark	0
Estonia	0
Finland	0
France	1
Germany	0
Greece	0
Hungary	0
Ireland	0
Italy	0
Latvia	0
Lithuania	0
Luxembourg	0
Malta	0
Netherlands	0
Poland	0
Portugal	0
Romania	0
Slovakia	0
Slovenia	0
Spain	1
Sweden	0
Iceland	0
Liechtenstein	0
Norway	0
Total EU	2
Total EEA	2

Measure 2.3

Relevant Signatories will adapt their current ad verification and review systems as appropriate and commercially feasible, with the aim of preventing ads placed through or on their services that do not comply with their advertising policies in respect of Disinformation to be inclusive of advertising message, promoted content, and site landing page.

QRE 2.3.1

Signatories will describe the systems and procedures they use to ensure that ads placed through their services comply with their advertising policies as described in Measure 2.1.

All advertising that runs on LinkedIn’s platform is subject to LinkedIn’s Advertising Policies. LinkedIn has implemented both automated and manual systems to help ensure that advertising on the platform complies with its Advertising Policies, and that ads that do not comply with its policies are removed.

When an advertiser submits an advertising campaign, the campaign is evaluated by LinkedIn automated systems. If those systems determine a campaign may violate LinkedIn’s policies, the campaign is rejected or forwarded to LinkedIn’s advertising review team for manual review.

The advertising review team is trained in LinkedIn’s Advertising Policies and dedicated to advertising review. LinkedIn also employs a dedicated team of trainers, who not only support the onboarding of new ad reviewers, but also provide ongoing educational opportunities for reviewers.

LinkedIn similarly employs quality assurance analysts, who provide one-on-one coaching, as well as regular monthly forums to discuss reviewers’ most frequent challenges. For complex issues, reviewers have direct access to global advertising policy managers through regular office hours and dedicated escalation pathways.

LinkedIn members may also report ads that they believe violate LinkedIn’s advertising policies, and when members report ads LinkedIn’s advertising review team reviews them. To report an ad, members can click on the three-dot icon in the upper right-hand corner of every ad and select the “Hide or report this ad” option. Members are then directed to select a reporting reason, with “Misinformation” provided as a reporting option.

SLI 2.3.1

Signatories will report quantitatively, at the Member State level, on the ads removed or prohibited from their services using procedures outlined in Measure 2.3. In the event of ads successfully removed, parties should report on the reach of violatory content and advertising.

The table below reports metrics concerning ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1. The metrics include: (1) the number of ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1 between 1 January - 30 June 2025, broken out by EEA Member State; (2) the number of impressions those ads received before they were restricted. The metrics are assigned to EEA Member States based on the primary country targeting of the ad.

The following factors may contribute to the number of ads reported by LinkedIn being lower than other platforms:

LinkedIn is primarily a business-to-business advertising platform – that is, businesses marketing their products and services to other businesses and members in a professional capacity.
Because of the business-to-business nature of LinkedIn’s advertising platform, ads on LinkedIn may cost more than ads on other platforms, impacting the ads run on LinkedIn.

Country	The number of ads LinkedIn restricted under the misinformation policies in QRE 2.1.1 between 1 January 30 June 2025	The number of impressions the ads received before they were restricted
Austria	0	0
Belgium	0	0
Bulgaria	0	0
Croatia	0	0
Cyprus	0	0
Czech Republic	0	0
Denmark	0	0
Estonia	0	0
Finland	0	0
France	1	0
Germany	0	0
Greece	0	0
Hungary	0	0
Ireland	0	0
Italy	0	0
Latvia	0	0
Lithuania	0	0
Luxembourg	0	0
Malta	0	0
Netherlands	0	0
Poland	0	0
Portugal	0	0
Romania	0	0
Slovakia	0	0
Slovenia	0	0
Spain	1	0
Sweden	0	0
Iceland	0	0
Liechtenstein	0	0
Norway	0	0
Total EU	2	0
Total EEA	2	0

Measure 2.4

Relevant Signatories will provide relevant information to advertisers about which advertising policies have been violated when they reject or remove ads violating policies described in Measure 2.1 above or disable advertising accounts in application of these policies and clarify their procedures for appeal.

QRE 2.4.1

Signatories will describe how they provide information to advertisers about advertising policies they have violated and how advertisers can appeal these policies.

When LinkedIn rejects or restricts an ad for violation of its policies, as described in QRE 2.3.1, LinkedIn sends the advertiser an email notification. The email notification outlines the rejection reason and advertising policy that the ad has violated.

The notification also provides advertisers instructions regarding how they can address the violation, including by revising the ad in LinkedIn Campaign Manager to address the violations, or by contacting their sales representative or LinkedIn customer support if they require clarification or believe there has been a mistake.

Because advertisers can address rejections a number of ways – by revising and resubmitting the advertisement, by creating a new advertisement that complies with LinkedIn’s policies, or by contacting their LinkedIn sales representative or customer support – LinkedIn does not report “appeal” and “appeal grant” metrics for ad rejections. LinkedIn has provided metrics on the number of ad restrictions as part of SLI 2.3.1 above.

SLI 2.4.1

Signatories will report quantitatively, at the Member State level, on the number of appeals per their standard procedures they received from advertisers on the application of their policies and on the proportion of these appeals that led to a change of the initial policy decision.

LinkedIn does not report “appeal” and “appeal grant” metrics for ad rejections as outlined in our response to QRE 2.4.1. LinkedIn has provided metrics on the number of ad restrictions as part of SLI 2.3.1 above.

	Nr of appeals	Proportion of appeals that led to a change of the initial decision
Global	Not applicable	Not applicable

Political Advertising

Commitment 5

Relevant Signatories commit to apply a consistent approach across political and issue advertising on their services and to clearly indicate in their advertising policies the extent to which such advertising is permitted or prohibited on their services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 5.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not applicable as LinkedIn currently prohibits all political advertising, as outlined under QRE 5.1.1.

Measure 5.1

Relevant Signatories will apply the labelling, transparency and verification principles (as set out below) across all ads relevant to their Commitments 4 and 5. They will publicise their policy rules or guidelines pertaining to their service's definition(s) of political and/or issue advertising in a publicly available and easily understandable way.

QRE 5.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on their policy rules or guidelines and on their approach towards publicising them.

LinkedIn’s Advertising Policies do not allow political advertising, and LinkedIn has not allowed political advertising since 2018.

Among other things, LinkedIn Advertising policies prohibit “ads advocating for or against a particular candidate, party, or ballot proposition or otherwise intended to influence an election outcome” and “ads fundraising for or by political candidates, parties, political action committees or similar organisations, or ballot propositions.” In addition, LinkedIn’s Advertising Policies prohibit certain types of advertisements that might be considered issue based. For example, “ads exploiting a sensitive political issue even if the advertiser has no explicit political agenda” are also prohibited.

Commitment 7

Relevant Signatories commit to put proportionate and appropriate identity verification systems in place for sponsors and providers of advertising services acting on behalf of sponsors placing political or issue ads. Relevant signatories will make sure that labelling and user-facing transparency requirements are met before allowing placement of such ads.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 7.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not applicable

Measure 7.3

Relevant Signatories will take appropriate action, such as suspensions or other account-level penalties, against political or issue ad sponsors who demonstrably evade verification and transparency requirements via on-platform tactics. Relevant Signatories will develop - or provide via existing tools - functionalities that allow users to flag ads that are not labelled as political.

QRE 7.3.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the tools and processes in place to request a declaration on whether the advertising service requested constitutes political or issue advertising.

As set out in QRE 5.1.1, LinkedIn’s Advertising Policies prohibit political advertising. Before submitting a campaign, customers must agree that their ad complies with LinkedIn’s policies.

As detailed in QRE 2.3.1, LinkedIn has implemented both automated and manual systems to help ensure that advertising on the platform complies with its Advertising Policies, and that ads that do not comply with its policies are removed. These enforcement systems apply equally to prohibited political advertising, as well as other violations of LinkedIn’s Advertising Policies.

In addition to LinkedIn’s pre-emptive enforcement, LinkedIn members may also report ads that they believe violate LinkedIn’s advertising policies, and when members report ads LinkedIn’s advertising review team reviews them. To report an ad, members can click on the three-dot icon in the upper right-hand corner of every ad and select the “Hide or report this ad” option.

QRE 7.3.2

Relevant Signatories will report on policies in place against political or issue ad sponsors who demonstrably evade verification and transparency requirements on-platform.

As set out in QRE 5.1.1, LinkedIn’s Advertising Policies prohibit political advertising. Ads that do not comply with LinkedIn’s Advertising Policies are removed.

Integrity of Services

Commitment 15

Relevant Signatories that develop or operate AI systems and that disseminate AI-generated and manipulated content through their services (e.g. deepfakes) commit to take into consideration the transparency obligations and the list of manipulative practices prohibited under the proposal for Artificial Intelligence Act.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 15.1 Measure 15.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Additional transparency on use of personal data for generative AI.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

LinkedIn will continue to assess its policies and services and to update them as warranted.

Measure 15.1

Relevant signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content, such as warning users and proactively detect such content.

QRE 15.1.1

In line with EU and national legislation, Relevant Signatories will report on their policies in place for countering prohibited manipulative practices for AI systems that generate or manipulate content.

During the reporting period, LinkedIn continued to support and launch products and features that disseminate, and enable LinkedIn members to disseminate, AI-generated textual content. LinkedIn also continues to integrate generative AI-powered features into existing products. To mitigate the potential safety risks posed by such features, LinkedIn has in place and continues to augment policies and procedures to ensure that our AI systems, including any new features are consistent with LinkedIn’s Responsible AI Principles and applicable law.

Privacy and Security – LinkedIn has an existing process for assessing the privacy and security of new products and initiatives, which has been augmented to recognize particular risks arising from the use of generative AI. With respect to generative AI, additional considerations include being thoughtful about the personal data used in prompt engineering and ensuring that members maintain full control of their profiles.
Safety – LinkedIn has an existing process for assessing the safety of new products and initiatives, that has been augmented to recognize particular risks with generative AI. New features are carefully ramped to members and rate limits are introduced to reduce the likelihood of abuse. Limiting access allows us to watch for issues that may arise. We aim to proactively identify how prompts could be misused to then mitigate potential abuse. We engage in proactive content moderation (all AI generated content is held to the same professional bar as other content on the LinkedIn platform), through applying content moderation filters to both the member inputs for prompts and the output. We also engage in reactive content moderation, through provision of member tools to report policy-violating issues with the content. Additional features have been added to these tools that address generative AI-specific issues such as ‘hallucinations.’ Additionally, all generative AI-powered features that have outputs that are directly visible to LinkedIn users, go through (1) manual and automated “red teaming,” to test the generative AI-powered feature and to identify and mitigate any vulnerabilities, and (2) quality assurance assessments on response quality, accuracy, and hallucinations with the goal to remediate discovered inaccuracies.
Fairness and Inclusion – LinkedIn has a cross functional team that designs policy and process to proactively mitigate the risk that AI tools, including generative AI tools, perpetuate societal biases or facilitate discrimination. To promote fairness and inclusion, we target two key areas - content subject and communities. With respect to content subjects, prompts are engineered to reduce the risk of biased content, blocklists are leveraged to replace harmful terms with neutral terms, and member feedback is monitored to learn and improve. With respect to communities, in addition to a focus on problematic content like stereotypes, we are working to expand the member communities that are served by our generative AI tools. Additionally, LinkedIn continues to invest in methodologies and techniques to more broadly ensure algorithmic fairness.
Transparency – LinkedIn is committed to being transparent with members. With respect to generative AI products and features, our goal is to educate members about the technology and our use of it such that they can make their own decisions about how to engage with it. Additionally, LinkedIn labels content containing industry-leading “Content Credentials” technology developed by the Coalition for Content Provenance and Authenticity (“C2PA”), including AI-generated content containing C2PA metadata. Content Credentials on LinkedIn show as a “Cr” icon on images and videos that contain C2PA metadata, particularly on highly visible surfaces such as the feed. By clicking the icon, LinkedIn members can trace the origin of the AI-created media, including the source and history of the content, and whether it was created or edited by AI. Additionally, LinkedIn provides members with information on how their personal data is used for generative AI in the LinkedIn Help Center, including how personal data is used for content generating AI model training. As of June 30, 2025, LinkedIn did not train content generating AI models on data from members located in the EU, EEA, UK, Switzerland, Canada, Hong Kong, or mainland China.
Accountability – In addition to the privacy, security, and safety processes discussed above, for AI tools we have additional assessments of training data and model cards so we can more appropriately assess risks and develop mitigations for the AI models that support our AI products and initiatives.

Measure 15.2

Relevant Signatories will establish or confirm their policies in place to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices impermissibly distorting their behaviour in line with Union and Member States legislation.

QRE 15.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on their policies and actions to ensure that the algorithms used for detection, moderation and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content on their services are trustworthy, respect the rights of end-users and do not constitute prohibited manipulative practices in line with Union and Member States legislation.

With respect to the algorithms used for detection, moderation, and sanctioning of impermissible conduct and content, please see:

QRE 15.1.1 (policies for countering prohibited manipulative practices in AI systems); and
QRE 18.2.1 (policies and procedures to limit spread of harmful false or misleading information).

Commitment 16

Relevant Signatories commit to operate channels of exchange between their relevant teams in order to proactively share information about cross-platform influence operations, foreign interference in information space and relevant incidents that emerge on their respective services, with the aim of preventing dissemination and resurgence on other services, in full compliance with privacy legislation and with due consideration for security and human rights risks.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 16.1 Measure 16.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

We look forward to continuing to work on this commitment with the other signatories as we develop further cross-platform information sharing.

Measure 16.1

Relevant Signatories will share relevant information about cross-platform information manipulation, foreign interference in information space and incidents that emerge on their respective services for instance via a dedicated sub-group of the permanent Task-force or via existing fora for exchanging such information.

QRE 16.1.1

Relevant Signatories will disclose the fora they use for information sharing as well as information about learnings derived from this sharing.

LinkedIn works with numerous partners to facilitate the flow of information to tackle purveyors of disinformation, including disinformation spread by state-sponsored and institutional actors. LinkedIn maintains an internal Trust and Safety team composed of threat investigators and intelligence analysts to address disinformation. This team works with peers and other stakeholders, including our Artificial Intelligence modelling team, to identify and remove nation-state actors and coordinated inauthentic campaigns. LinkedIn conducts investigations into election-related influence operations and nation-state targeting including continued information sharing on threats with industry peers and Law Enforcement on a regular basis. LinkedIn works with peer companies and other stakeholders to receive and share indicators related to fake accounts created by state-sponsored actors, such as confirmed Tactics, Techniques, and Protocols (TTPs) and Indicators of Compromise (IOC). This exchange of information leads to a better understanding of the incentives of sophisticated and well-funded threat actors and how they evolve their TTPs to achieve those goals, which assists LinkedIn in their identification and removal. Any associated disinformation content is verified by our internal or external fact-checkers as needed, and coordinated inauthentic behaviours (CIBs) are also removed by our Threat Prevention and Defense team.

LinkedIn is heavily involved in threat exchanges. These threat exchanges take various forms, such as: 1) regular discussion amongst industry peers to discuss high-level trends and campaigns; and, 2) one-on-one engagement with individual peer companies to discuss TTPs and IOCs. This exchange of information leads to a better understanding of the incentives of sophisticated and well-funded threat actors and how they evolve their TTPs to achieve those goals, which assists us in their identification and removal.

LinkedIn always stands ready to receive and investigate any leads we receive from peers and other external stakeholders. In addition to one-on-one engagement with peers, we also consume intelligence from vendors and investigate any TTPs and IOCs made available in peer disclosures. In turn, we also regularly release information about policy-violating content on our platform in publicly available transparency reports and blog posts.

SLI 16.1.1

Number of actions taken as a result of the collaboration and information sharing between signatories. Where they have such information, they will specify which Member States that were affected (including information about the content being detected and acted upon due to this collaboration).

We look forward to providing reports where appropriate in future reporting periods.

Measure 16.2

Relevant Signatories will pay specific attention to and share information on the tactical migration of known actors of misinformation, disinformation and information manipulation across different platforms as a way to circumvent moderation policies, engage different audiences or coordinate action on platforms with less scrutiny and policy bandwidth.

QRE 16.2.1

As a result of the collaboration and information sharing between them, Relevant Signatories will share qualitative examples and case studies of migration tactics employed and advertised by such actors on their platforms as observed by their moderation team and/or external partners from Academia or fact-checking organisations engaged in such monitoring.

We look forward to working on this commitment with the other signatories as we develop further cross-platform information sharing.

Empowering Users

Commitment 18

Relevant Signatories commit to minimise the risks of viral propagation of Disinformation by adopting safe design practices as they develop their systems, policies, and features.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 18.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

LinkedIn will continue to assess its policies and services and to update them as warranted.

Measure 18.2

Relevant Signatories will develop and enforce publicly documented, proportionate policies to limit the spread of harmful false or misleading information (as depends on the service, such as prohibiting, downranking, or not recommending harmful false or misleading information, adapted to the severity of the impacts and with due regard to freedom of expression and information); and take action on webpages or actors that persistently violate these policies.

QRE 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the policies or terms of service that are relevant to Measure 18.2 and on their approach towards persistent violations of these policies.

LinkedIn is an online professional network. On LinkedIn, the world’s professionals come together to find jobs, stay informed, learn new skills, and build productive relationships. The content that our members share becomes part of their professional identity and can be seen by their boss, colleagues, and potential business partners. Accordingly, the content on LinkedIn is professional in nature.

To help keep LinkedIn safe, trusted, and professional, our Professional Community Policies clearly detail the range of objectionable and harmful content that is not allowed on LinkedIn. Fake accounts, misinformation, and inauthentic content are not allowed, and we take active steps to remove it from our platform.

LinkedIn removes “specific claims, presented as fact, that are demonstrably false or substantially misleading and likely to cause harm.” This approach applies globally and is used for purposes of content moderation and for publicly reporting figures on misinformation. Specific examples of what might constitute misinformation can be found here in our Help Center. As part of our User Agreement, our Professional Community Policies are accepted by every member when joining LinkedIn and are easily available to every member.

LinkedIn creates value and preserves trust by fostering a safe, trusted, and professional platform, while honouring members’ professional expression and speech. LinkedIn enables healthy on-platform conversations by facilitating the removal of misinformation that threatens its members’ safety. And when content doesn’t conclusively violate LinkedIn policies, LinkedIn gives the speaker the benefit of the doubt and favours speech (i.e., leaves the content up on platform).

Additionally, as described in greater detail below, human review plays a significant role in our content moderation process. Additionally, Members who post content and members who report content can appeal our content moderation decisions.

Our content policies are clear and we apply them equally for all members. Within our Professional Community Policies we provide granular information and examples on what is and what is not allowed on LinkedIn.

Furthermore, LinkedIn has automated defences to identify and prevent abuse, including inauthentic behaviour, such as spam, phishing and scams, duplicate accounts, fake accounts, and misinformation. Our Trust and Safety teams work every day to identify and restrict inauthentic activity. We’re regularly rolling out scalable technologies like machine learning models to keep our platform safe.

SLI 18.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on actions taken in response to violations of policies relevant to Measure 18.2, at the Member State level. The metrics shall include: Total number of violations and Meaningful metrics to measure the impact of these actions (such as their impact on the visibility of or the engagement with content that was actioned upon).

The table below reports metrics concerning content LinkedIn removed from its platform as Misinformation, pursuant to the policy outlined in QRE 18.2.1 above. The metrics include:

the number of pieces of content removed as Misinformation between 1 January – 30 June 2025, broken out by EEA Member State;
the number of those content removals that were appealed by the content author;
the number of those appeals that were granted;
the median time from appeal-to-appeal decision for those appeals. The metrics are assigned to EEA Member State based on the IP address of the of the content author.

Country	The number of pieces of content removed as Misinformation between 1 January 30 June 2025	The number of removals that were appealed by the content author	The number of appeals that were granted	The median time from appeal-to-appeal decision in hours
Austria	200	0	0	1.0 hours
Belgium	438	6	1
Bulgaria	36	0	0
Croatia	74	2	1
Cyprus	20	0	0
Czech Republic	70	1	0
Denmark	344	0	0
Estonia	13	0	0
Finland	36	0	0
France	3,686	11	2
Germany	1,646	15	0
Greece	190	1	0
Hungary	42	0	0
Ireland	168	0	0
Italy	1,462	10	3
Latvia	11	0	0
Lithuania	15	1	0
Luxembourg	53	0	0
Malta	9	1	0
Netherlands	2,586	21	5
Poland	144	1	1
Portugal	185	0	0
Romania	174	0	0
Slovakia	7	0	0
Slovenia	14	0	0
Spain	738	4	0
Sweden	220	0	0
Iceland	5	0	0
Liechtenstein	4	0	0
Norway	85	5	0
Total EU	12,581	74	13
Total EEA	12,675	79	13

Commitment 19

Relevant Signatories using recommender systems commit to make them transparent to the recipients regarding the main criteria and parameters used for prioritising or deprioritising information, and provide options to users about recommender systems, and make available information on those options.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 19.1 Measure 19.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not applicable

Measure 19.1

Relevant Signatories will make available to their users, including through the Transparency Centre and in their terms and conditions, in a clear, accessible and easily comprehensible manner, information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ.

QRE 19.1.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of the policies and measures put in place to implement the above-mentioned measures accessible to EU users, especially by publishing information outlining the main parameters their recommender systems employ in this regard. This information should also be included in the Transparency Centre.

LinkedIn has published a variety of articles to explain to users how our recommender systems work, including:“Mythbusting the Feed: How theAlgorithm Works”; "Mythbusting the Feed: Helping our members betterunderstand LinkedIn";"Keeping your feed relevant and productive"; LinkedInSafety Series: Using AI to Protect Member Data ; “Guide: Features to Help You Control Your Feed and Conversations”; Our approach to building transparentand explainable AI systems, Suggested Posts in Feed. During earlier reporting periods LinkedIn collated and expanded upon existing resources to further explainthe main parameters of LinkedIn recommender systems and options provided to users to influence and control these recommender systems.

Additionally, LinkedIn addresses automated processing and relevancy in the LinkedInUser Agreementand it includes a link to the above referenced Help Centre article in Section 3.6 of the LinkedIn User Agreement, which section focuses on recommendations and automated processing. During an earlier reporting period, LinkedIn launched a new setting for members to control the default for how their LinkedIn feed is presented to them. Members can now change their preferred feed view from “most relevant first” to “most recent first”. “Most relevant first” means that LinkedIn will use data from the member’s profile and LinkedIn activity data to rank feed content based on the member’s interests. “Most recent first” means that LinkedIn will not use the member’s profile and LinkedIn activity data to rank feed content and will instead show updates from the member’s network in reverse chronological order.

As reported in an earlier report, in August 2023, LinkedIn launched two new experiences in the EU. Additional detail is included below:

LinkedIn launched a revised and expanded experience to enable Members to change how their Feed experience is presented to them. The choice is presented in the Feed (on desktop, mobile app, and mobile web) and it also points members to the setting referenced above where members can change the default sort of their Feed. Members can toggle between the following two choices: “most relevant first” or “most recent first.” The default sort option is “most relevant first.” If the Member toggles to “most recent first,” that choice will only persist for the current feed view on that particular device.
LinkedIn also launched a new setting within a Member’s Account Preferences settings so Members can change the default sort option from “most relevant first” to “most recent first.” Changing that setting will persist across sessions and devices. Members can learn more about this experience and the setting in our Help Center.

Measure 19.2

Relevant Signatories will provide options for the recipients of the service to select and to modify at any time their preferred options for relevant recommender systems, including giving users transparency about those options.

SLI 19.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide aggregated information on effective user settings, such as the number of times users have actively engaged with these settings within the reporting period or over a sample representative timeframe, and clearly denote shifts in configuration patterns.

Members that do not wish to have their LinkedIn feed experience sorted by relevance can change the default of how their LinkedIn feed experience is sorted via a setting.

The table below reports: (1) the number of EEA members who used the “preferred feed view” setting between 1 January – 30 June 2025; and (2) the number of times those members used the “preferred feed view” setting between 1 January – 30 June 2025.

The metrics are assigned to EEA Member State based on the self-reported profile location of the member.

Country	The number of EEA members who used the preferred feed view setting between 1 January 30 June 2025	The number of times the members used the preferred feed view setting between 1 January 30 June 2025
Austria	2,062	5,066
Belgium	3,419	9,028
Bulgaria	568	1,524
Croatia	529	1,762
Cyprus	314	788
Czech Republic	1,307	3,268
Denmark	2,993	7,514
Estonia	359	922
Finland	2,863	7,260
France	20,691	60,468
Germany	22,349	56,770
Greece	1,453	3,956
Hungary	811	2,020
Ireland	3,583	9,064
Italy	8,037	20,322
Latvia	334	950
Lithuania	429	1,164
Luxembourg	456	1,162
Malta	205	528
Netherlands	14,538	37,984
Poland	4,419	11,046
Portugal	2,856	7,608
Romania	1,395	3,812
Slovakia	400	1,024
Slovenia	259	658
Spain	11,068	27,908
Sweden	4,542	11,378
Iceland	64	230
Liechtenstein	33	92
Norway	1,272	4,000
Total EU	112,239	294,954
Total EEA	113,608	299,276

Commitment 20

Relevant Signatories commit to empower users with tools to assess the provenance and edit history or authenticity or accuracy of digital content.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 20.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not applicable

Measure 20.2

Relevant Signatories will take steps to join/support global initiatives and standards bodies (for instance, C2PA) focused on the development of provenance tools.

QRE 20.2.1

Relevant Signatories will provide details of global initiatives and standards bodies focused on the development of provenance tools (for instance, C2PA) that signatories have joined, or the support given to relevant organisations, providing links to organisation websites where possible.

LinkedIn has adopted the C2PA’s industry-leading “Content Credentials” technology to include metadata labelling, including data about whether content is created using AI, on content containing the C2PA technology. LinkedIn has also published an article in its Help Center which provides more information on C2PA and Content Credentials.

Commitment 23

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with the functionality to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories policies or terms of service.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 23.1 Measure 23.2

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not applicable

Measure 23.1

Relevant Signatories will develop or continue to make available on all their services and in all Member States languages in which their services are provided a user-friendly functionality for users to flag harmful false and/or misleading information that violates Signatories' policies or terms of service. The functionality should lead to appropriate, proportionate and consistent follow-up actions, in full respect of the freedom of expression.

QRE 23.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the availability of flagging systems for their policies related to harmful false and/or misleading information across EU Member States and specify the different steps that are required to trigger the systems.

If LinkedIn users locate content they believe violates our Professional Community Policies, we encourage them to report it using the in-product reporting mechanism represented by the three dots in the upper right-hand corner of the content itself on LinkedIn.

Misinformation is specifically called out as one of the reporting options.

The reporting feature is available through, and largely identical across, LinkedIn’s website and mobile app, although reporting reasons and their visual presentation may vary slightly for certain types of content. In most instances, the reporting process is located just one click away from the content being reported and, depending on whether content is reported in the LinkedIn App or on desktop, the reporting process takes between four or five clicks to complete.

Reported content generally is reviewed by trained content reviewers. In addition, LinkedIn uses automation to flag potentially violative content to our content moderation teams. If reported or flagged content violates the Professional Community Policies, it will be actioned in accordance with our policies.

When members use the above reporting process, they will receive an email acknowledging receipt of the report. The email includes a link to the report status page, which we update when we make a decision, including providing the opportunity to appeal. Logged-out users receive updates on their report by email and are also provided with the opportunity to appeal.

Members also receive an email notifying them in in the event their content actioned in accordance with our policies. The email includes a link to a notice page for additional details and resources. If the member believes that their content complies with our Professional Community Policies, they can ask us to revisit our decision by submitting an appeal by clicking on the link in the notice page.

Further, LinkedIn has a dedicated process for those entities who have been awarded Trusted Flagger status in accordance with Article 22 of the Digital Services Act.

Measure 23.2

Relevant Signatories will take the necessary measures to ensure that this functionality is duly protected from human or machine-based abuse (e.g., the tactic of 'mass-flagging' to silence other voices).

QRE 23.2.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the general measures they take to ensure the integrity of their reporting and appeals systems, while steering clear of disclosing information that would help would-be abusers find and exploit vulnerabilities in their defences.

As noted in our response to QRE 23.1.1, content that is flagged as misinformation (whether reported or automatically detected) is removed from LinkedIn. LinkedIn has a quality assurance team that is dedicated to ensure the quality of our content review processes and decisions. For example, the quality assurance team performs quality checks, on a routine basis, the content moderation decisions that have previously been made. This also allows us to improve our processes and further strengthen our platform as a trusted source of information.

Furthermore, as a real identity professional network, LinkedIn acts vigilantly to maintain the integrity of all accounts and to ward off bot and false account activity. LinkedIn enforces the policies in its UserAgreement prohibiting the use of “bots or other unauthorized automated methods to access the Services, add or download contacts, send or redirect messages, create, comment on, like, share, or re-share posts, or otherwise drive inauthentic engagement” through:

Maintaining a dedicated Anti-Abuse team to research emerging trends and key risks and develop tools to address them
Using AI to detect inauthentic activity and communities of fake accounts
Using automated systems detect and block automated activity
Imposing limits on certain categories of activity commonly engaged in by bad actors
Conducting manual investigation and restriction of accounts engaged in automated activity
Maintaining 24/7 escalation paths to address any emerging issues.

Commitment 24

Relevant Signatories commit to inform users whose content or accounts has been subject to enforcement actions (content/accounts labelled, demoted or otherwise enforced on) taken on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section (as outlined in Measure 18.2), and provide them with the possibility to appeal against the enforcement action at issue and to handle complaints in a timely, diligent, transparent, and objective manner and to reverse the action without undue delay where the complaint is deemed to be founded.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 24.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not applicable

Measure 24.1

Relevant Signatories commit to provide users with information on why particular content or accounts have been labelled, demoted, or otherwise enforced on, on the basis of violation of policies relevant to this section, as well as the basis for such enforcement action, and the possibility for them to appeal through a transparent mechanism.

QRE 24.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the availability of their notification and appeals systems across Member States and languages and provide details on the steps of the appeals procedure.

LinkedIn removes “specific claims, presented as fact, that are demonstrably false or substantially misleading and likely to cause harm.”

The author whose content we’ve actioned will generally be notified when we take action. Notices are typically sent by email and contain a link to a notice page containing certain additional information (e.g., about the content at issue, the policy violated, the action LinkedIn has taken, redress info and, in most instances, a link to allow the individual to appeal LinkedIn's decision). If the author believes LinkedIn has made a mistake in actioning their content, the member can ask LinkedIn to take a second look by clicking the link to submit an appeal. In order to submit the appeal, the member must confirm that they have read the relevant LinkedIn policy (a link is provided to the relevant policy, for example, LinkedIn’s policy on false and misleading information) and confirm that having reviewed the content at issue, they believe it complies with the policy. LinkedIn reviews those appeals and notifies the member of its appeal decision. If the appeal is successful, we put the content back up on LinkedIn.

Appeals made by members are treated the same regardless of whether they use LinkedIn’s premium services.

SLI 24.1.1

Relevant Signatories provide information on the number and nature of enforcement actions for policies described in response to Measure 18.2, the numbers of such actions that were subsequently appealed, the results of these appeals, information, and to the extent possible metrics, providing insight into the duration or effectiveness of processing of appeals process, and publish this information on the Transparency Centre.

The table below reports metrics concerning content LinkedIn removed from its platform as Misinformation, pursuant to the policy outlined in QRE 18.2.1. The metrics include:

(1) the number of pieces of content removed as Misinformation between 1 January – 30 June 2025, broken out by EEA Member State;
(2) the number of those content removals that were appealed by the content author;
(3) the number of those appeals that were granted;
(4) the median time from appeal to appeal decision for those appeals. The metrics are assigned to EEA Member State based on the self-reported profile location of the content author.

Country	The number of pieces of content removed as Misinformation between 1 January 30 June 2025.	The number of those content removals that were appealed by the content author	The number of those appeals that were granted	The number of removals that were appealed by the content author
Austria	200	0	0	1.0 hours
Belgium	438	6	1
Bulgaria	36	0	0
Croatia	74	2	1
Cyprus	20	0	0
Czech Republic	70	1	0
Denmark	344	0	0
Estonia	13	0	0
Finland	36	0	0
France	3,686	11	2
Germany	1,646	15	0
Greece	190	1	0
Hungary	42	0	0
Ireland	168	0	0
Italy	1,462	10	3
Latvia	11	0	0
Lithuania	15	1	0
Luxembourg	53	0	0
Malta	9	1	0
Netherlands	2,586	21	5
Poland	144	1	1
Portugal	185	0	0
Romania	174	0	0
Slovakia	7	0	0
Slovenia	14	0	0
Spain	738	4	0
Sweden	220	0	0
Iceland	5	0	0
Liechtenstein	4	0	0
Norway	85	5	0
Total EU	12,581	74	13
Total EEA	12,675	79	13

Empowering Researchers

Commitment 28

COOPERATION WITH RESEARCHERS Relevant Signatories commit to support good faith research into Disinformation that involves their services.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 28.1 Measure 28.2 Measure 28.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

On 16 January 2025, LinkedIn participated in a training series for researchers organised by EDMO.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Ongoing review of researcher feedback and needs may result in additional measures and resources being made available.

Measure 28.1

Relevant Signatories will ensure they have the appropriate human resources in place in order to facilitate research, and should set-up and maintain an open dialogue with researchers to keep track of the types of data that are likely to be in demand for research and to help researchers find relevant contact points in their organisations.

QRE 28.1.1

Relevant Signatories will describe the resources and processes they deploy to facilitate research and engage with the research community, including e.g. dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

LinkedIn facilitates research, engages with the research community, and provides data to the research community in a variety of ways, as described below.

Historically, LinkedIn’s work with external stakeholders, including, for example, research institutes, and academia, to understand the rapidly changing world of work through access to and use of LinkedIn data. Additionally, LinkedIn employs academics to gain practical experience combining industry knowledge with academic expertise to solve complex business problems spanning all areas of engineering, with an initial focus on artificial intelligence (including work related to large recommender systems and deep learning algorithms) and data science.

While the foregoing work remains critical to our mission, we are working to expand access to data for research purposes consistent with the goals of the CoP as well as the applicable requirements of the DSA and look forward to providing further information on this in future reports.

LinkedIn also has in place the needed teams and tools to make data available to researchers in a variety of ways, including via Excel or XML files, GitHub repositories, sandboxed laptops, and APIs.

Further, on 16 January 2025, LinkedIn representatives participated in a training series for researchers organised by the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). LinkedIn representatives provided an overview of LinkedIn’s Researcher Access Programme, which included an introduction to LinkedIn's current data and tools to support independent academic research and an overview of the application process for researchers.

Measure 28.2

Relevant Signatories will be transparent on the data types they currently make available to researchers across Europe.

QRE 28.2.1

Relevant Signatories will describe what data types European researchers can currently access via their APIs or via dedicated teams, tools, help centres, programs, or events.

LinkedIn supports the aims of the research community and regularly provides information and data to the research community in a variety of ways.

To date, we have made non-personal, aggregated data publicly available (data on gender equity in the workplace, data on green skills and jobs, data on industry and job skills, and data on engagement with labor markets and employment trends). Our goal with this action to enable researchers to understand the rapidly changing world of work through access to and use of LinkedIn data. Because much of our data is publicly available, the extent to which such data has been used for disinformation-related research purposes cannot easily be ascertained.

Additionally, LinkedIn is expanding its API access for public data for disinformation related research purposes. Information about the LinkedIn APIs are available to the public and researcher access is provided here.

For access to LinkedIn APIs, a researcher needs to submit an application, meet criteria for approval and provide additional information necessary for us to assess their project. APIs including non-public data may be made available for research purposes based on special requests and the ability of the researcher to protect personal data pursuant to GDPR and relevant intellectual property rights. Upon approval, the researcher’s application with be provisioned with the relevant APIs. In addition, access is available to anyone who visits the relevant LinkedIn site.

For access to other data, researchers may be provided with datasets and information as part of research inquiries and research partnerships with LinkedIn. Researchers may contact LinkedIn to discuss research opportunities.

Measure 28.3

Relevant Signatories will not prohibit or discourage genuinely and demonstratively public interest good faith research into Disinformation on their platforms, and will not take adversarial action against researcher users or accounts that undertake or participate in good-faith research into Disinformation.

QRE 28.3.1

Relevant Signatories will collaborate with EDMO to run an annual consultation of European researchers to assess whether they have experienced adversarial actions or are otherwise prohibited or discouraged to run such research.

We look forward to partnering with other relevant signatories on this project and will provide further reporting as the annual consultation is established.

Transparency Centre

Commitment 34

To ensure transparency and accountability around the implementation of this Code, Relevant Signatories commit to set up and maintain a publicly available common Transparency Centre website.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 34.1 Measure 34.2 Measure 34.3 Measure 34.4 Measure 34.5

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not applicable

Commitment 35

Signatories commit to ensure that the Transparency Centre contains all the relevant information related to the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures and that this information is presented in an easy-to-understand manner, per service, and is easily searchable.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 35.1 Measure 35.2 Measure 35.3 Measure 35.4 Measure 35.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

LinkedIn will upload its September 2025 Report to the Transparency Centre website.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not applicable

Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 37.1 Measure 37.2 Measure 37.3 Measure 37.4 Measure 37.5 Measure 37.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

LinkedIn has actively engaged in and contributed to the work of the Task-force and relevant Subgroups and Working Groups that were active during the reporting period.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

LinkedIn is committed to continuing its active engagement in and contribution to the Task-force in the upcoming six-month period. During that period, LinkedIn is also committed to continuing its active engagement in and contributions to Subgroups and Working Groups to the extent they pertain to Measures to which LinkedIn Ireland has subscribed in its Subscription Document.

Measure 37.2

Signatories agree to work in the Task-force in particular – but not limited to – on the following tasks: Establishing a risk assessment methodology and a rapid response system to be used in special situations like elections or crises; Cooperate and coordinate their work in special situations like elections or crisis; Agree on the harmonised reporting templates for the implementation of the Code's Commitments and Measures, the refined methodology of the reporting, and the relevant data disclosure for monitoring purposes; Review the quality and effectiveness of the harmonised reporting templates, as well as the formats and methods of data disclosure for monitoring purposes, throughout future monitoring cycles and adapt them, as needed; Contribute to the assessment of the quality and effectiveness of Service Level and Structural Indicators and the data points provided to measure these indicators, as well as their relevant adaptation; Refine, test and adjust Structural Indicators and design mechanisms to measure them at Member State level; Agree, publish and update a list of TTPs employed by malicious actors, and set down baseline elements, objectives and benchmarks for Measures to counter them, in line with the Chapter IV of this Code.

Per LinkedIn Ireland’s Subscription Document dated 15 January 2025, LinkedIn will commit to perform the obligations outlined in this Measure to the extent they pertain to the other Measures to which LinkedIn has subscribed under its Subscription Document and in a manner and level that is proportional to LinkedIn’s risk profile with respect to disinformation.

Measure 37.6

Signatories agree to notify the rest of the Task-force when a Commitment or Measure would benefit from changes over time as their practices and approaches evolve, in view of technological, societal, market, and legislative developments. Having discussed the changes required, the Relevant Signatories will update their subscription document accordingly and report on the changes in their next report.

QRE 37.6.1

Signatories will describe how they engage in the work of the Task-force in the reporting period, including the sub-groups they engaged with.

During the period covered by this report, LinkedIn actively engaged in and participated to all the plenary meetings of the Task-Force of the Code as well as to the meetings of the Elections Working Group, which was the only group active in the current reporting cycle under the Task-force. As part of the Elections Working Group, LinkedIn actively contributed to the development of the standardised version of the Rapid Response System for elections.

LinkedIn also participated in the Rapid Response Systems set up for the elections in Germany, Romania, Portugal and Poland.

Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 38.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not applicable

Measure 38.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

QRE 38.1.1

LinkedIn has a dedicated team to ensure proper tracking and compliance with the Code of Practice, consisting of members of our legal, public policy, content policy and data science teams.

Furthermore, as noted elsewhere in this report, LinkedIn had approximately 1,757 content moderators globally (for 24/7 coverage), with approximately 180 content moderators located in the EU as of 30 June 2025, and includes specialists in a number of EEA languages. LinkedIn’s in-house Editorial team also provides members with trustworthy content regarding global events.

Commitment 40

Signatories commit to provide regular reporting on Service Level Indicators (SLIs) and Qualitative Reporting Elements (QREs). The reports and data provided should allow for a thorough assessment of the extent of the implementation of the Code’s Commitments and Measures by each Signatory, service and at Member State level.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 40.1 Measure 40.3 Measure 40.4 Measure 40.5 Measure 40.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Not applicable

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Not applicable

Commitment 42

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

During the reporting period, LinkedIn has participated to the Task-force’s Elections Working Group, in particular in view of elections that took place in the EU as well as in the context of the discussions towards an Elections Rapid Response System.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

LinkedIn will continue its participation in the Task-force’s Crisis Response Subgroup and Elections Working Group, as relevant.

Commitment 43

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

LinkedIn has provided its September 2025 Report in accordance with the revised Harmonised Reporting Template and underlying methodologies as jointly developed by Signatories in the Monitoring and Reporting Subgroup under the Code’s Task-force.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

Yes

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

LinkedIn will continue its engagement in the respective Task-force Subgroups to keep the Harmonised Reporting Template and underlying methodologies up to date, where necessary in view of its experience with reporting.

Crisis and Elections Response

Elections 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

LinkedIn is an online professional networking site with a real identity requirement, which means that content posted by our members is visible to that member’s professional network, including colleagues, managers, and potential future employers. As a result of LinkedIn’s professional context, our members come to LinkedIn for economic opportunity, and as such, do not tend to post misinformation, nor does misinformation content gain traction on LinkedIn. Nonetheless, LinkedIn may be subject to certain members inadvertently posting misinformation during elections.

Mitigations in place

LinkedIn’s Professional Community Policies expressly prohibit false and misleading content, including misinformation and disinformation, and its in-house Editorial team provides members with trustworthy content regarding global events, including as applicable European national elections in Germany, Romania, Portugal and Poland. LinkedIn had approximately 1,757 content moderators globally (for 24/7) coverage, with approximately 180 content moderators located in the EU as at 30 June 2025, and includes specialists in a number of languages including French. These reviewers use policies and guidance developed by a dedicated content policy team and experienced lawyers, and work with external fact checkers as needed. When LinkedIn sees content or behaviour that violates its Professional Community Policies, it takes action, including for example the removal of content.

Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue, including European Elections.

LinkedIn continues to mature its crisis response processes as applicable. In addition to the increase in resource allocation and process improvements, best practices include: 1) quickly coordinating with industry peers regarding the exchange of threat indicators; 2) engaging with external stakeholders regarding trends and TTPs; 3) continuously providing updated policy guidance to internal teams to assist with the removal of misinformation; and 4) continuing to proactively provide localised trustworthy information to our members.

LinkedIn has continued to mature its crisis response playbook by continually monitoring crisis situations globally, expanding internal teams that work on crisis response, and maturing our processes to respond more efficiently and effectively to crisis situations. LinkedIn will continue to follow its processes related to the removal of misinformation, and continually increase investments in resource allocation and process improvements where necessary to respond to the demands of the crisis.

LinkedIn also implemented a specialized intake and operations process under the Elections Working Group Rapid Response System as applicable for European national elections.

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 50.1.1

False or misleading content

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 50.1.2

LinkedIn continually updates its policies as appropriate during any major global event, including European national elections in Germany, Romania, Portugal and Poland.

Rationale - 50.1.3

Misinformation, disinformation campaigns, coordinated manipulative behaviours, malicious use of advertising products, and the involvement of foreign state actors, are all harms that existed prior to the European national elections in Germany, Romania, Portugal and Poland, and therefore LinkedIn already had policies in place to address these harms.

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 50.2.2

Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue, including European national elections in Germany, Romania, Portugal and Poland.

Indication of impact - 50.2.3

Not applicable

Political Advertising

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 50.3.2

Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue, including European elections.

Indication of impact - 50.3.3

Not applicable

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 50.4.2

LinkedIn also maintains a robust automated and manual ad-review process to prevent ads related to European Elections from running on our platform.

LinkedIn regularly exchanges information with industry peers to identify and share granular information related to manipulative behaviours, coordinated influence operations, and TTPs. All such content that violates LinkedIn’s Professional Community Policies is removed.

Indication of impact - 50.4.3

LinkedIn does not track misinformation content removal by subject matter, and a comprehensive listing of its misinformation content takedowns is provided in this disclosure and in its Transparency Report. See also SLI 18.2.1.

Impact metrics for malicious advertising removals are available in SLI 2.1.1 and 2.3.1.

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 50.5.2

LinkedIn has an internal team of global news editors that provides trustworthy and authoritative content as applicable to its member-base at all times. During important events in European elections, this team provides manually curated and localised storylines.

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 50.6.2

None for LinkedIn

Indication of impact - 50.6.3

None for LinkedIn

Crisis 2025

Threats observed or anticipated

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
LinkedIn is an online professional networking site with a real identity requirement, which means that content posted by our members is visible to that member’s professional network, including colleagues, managers, and potential future employers. As a result of LinkedIn’s professional context, our members do not tend to post misinformation, nor does misinformation content gain traction on LinkedIn. Nonetheless, LinkedIn may be subject to certain members inadvertently posting misinformation during crisis situations.

Israel-Hamas Conflict
LinkedIn is an online professional networking site with a real identity requirement, which means that content posted by our members is visible to that member’s professional network, including colleagues, managers, and potential future employers. As a result of LinkedIn’s professional context, our members come to LinkedIn for economic opportunity, and as such, do not tend to post misinformation, nor does misinformation content gain traction on LinkedIn. Nonetheless, LinkedIn may be subject to certain members inadvertently posting misinformation during crisis situations.

Mitigations in place

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
LinkedIn’s Professional Community Policies expressly prohibit false and misleading content, including misinformation and disinformation, and its in-house Editorial team provides members with trustworthy content regarding global events, including the war in Ukraine. LinkedIn had approximately 1,757 content moderators globally (for 24/7 coverage), with approximately 180 content moderators located in the EU as of 30 June 2025, and includes specialists in a number of languages including English, German, French, Russian, and Ukrainian. These reviewers use policies and guidance developed by a dedicated content policy team and experienced lawyers, and work with external fact checkers as needed. When LinkedIn sees content or behaviour that violates its Professional Community Policies, it takes action, including for example the removal of content. LinkedIn has been banned in Russia since 2016 and has implemented the European bans on Russian state media. In addition to not operating in Russia, political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue, including the current Russia-Ukraine war.

LinkedIn continues to mature its crisis response processes as applicable including 1) quickly coordinating with industry peers regarding the exchange of threat indicators; 2) engaging with external stakeholders regarding trends and TTPs; 3) continuously providing updated policy guidance to internal teams to assist with the removal of misinformation; and 4) continuing to proactively provide localised trustworthy information to our members.

Israel-Hamas Conflict
LinkedIn’s Professional Community Policies expressly prohibit false and misleading content, including misinformation and disinformation, and its in-house Editorial team provides members with trustworthy content regarding global events, including the Israel-Hamas conflict. LinkedIn had approximately 1,757 content moderators globally (for 24/7 coverage), with approximately 180 content moderators located in the EU as at 30 June 2025, , and includes specialists in languages supported on LinkedIn. These reviewers use policies and guidance developed by a dedicated content policy team and experienced lawyers, and work with external fact checkers as needed. When LinkedIn sees content or behaviour that violates its Professional Community Policies, it takes action, including for example the removal of content. Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue, including the current Israel-Hamas conflict.

LinkedIn continues to mature its crisis response processes as applicable including 1) quickly coordinating with industry peers regarding the exchange of threat indicators; 2) engaging with external stakeholders regarding trends and TTPs; 3) continuously providing updated policy guidance to internal teams to assist with the removal of misinformation; and 4) continuing to proactively provide localised trustworthy information to our members.

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 51.1.1

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
False or misleading content

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
LinkedIn continually updates its policies as appropriate during any crisis, including the Ukraine crisis.

Rationale - 51.1.3

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Misinformation, disinformation campaigns, coordinated manipulative behaviours, malicious use of advertising products, and the involvement of foreign state actors, are all harms that existed prior to the Ukraine crisis, and therefore LinkedIn already had policies in place to address these harms.

Policy - 51.1.4

Israel-Hamas Conflict
False or misleading content

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.5

Israel-Hamas Conflict
LinkedIn continually updates its policies as appropriate during any crisis, including the Israel-Hamas conflict.

Rationale - 51.1.6

Israel-Hamas Conflict
Misinformation, disinformation campaigns, coordinated manipulative behaviours, malicious use of advertising products, and the involvement of foreign state actors, are all harms that existed prior to the Israel-Hamas conflict, and therefore LinkedIn already had policies in place to address these harms.

Scrutiny of Ads Placements

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.2.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue.

Indication of impact - 51.2.3

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Not applicable

Description of intervention - 51.2.5

Israel-Hamas Conflict
Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue, including the current Israel-Hamas conflict.

Political Advertising

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.3.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Not applicable. Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue.

Indication of impact - 51.3.3

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
Not applicable

Description of intervention - 51.3.5

Israel-Hamas Conflict
Not applicable. Political ads are banned on LinkedIn, which includes prohibitions on ads that exploit a sensitive political issue, including the current Israel-Hamas conflict.

Indication of impact - 51.3.6

Israel-Hamas Conflict
Not applicable

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.4.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
LinkedIn’s Professional Community Policies prohibit misinformation, and misinformation is removed from the LinkedIn platform.

Members that post misinformation are notified of LinkedIn’s removal of their content. State-sponsored attempts to post misinformation, if any, are removed.

LinkedIn also maintains a robust ad-review process to prevent malicious advertising wherein ads related to crises, including the Ukraine war, are manually reviewed and approved by our internal team.

Indication of impact - 51.4.3

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
LinkedIn does not track misinformation content removal by subject matter, and a comprehensive listing of its misinformation content takedowns is provided in this disclosure and in its Transparency Report. See also SLI 18.2.1.

Impact metrics for malicious advertising removals are available in SLI 2.1.1 and 2.3.1, whereas metrics related to manipulative behaviors and TTPs are available in SLI 12.1.1 and 14.2.1.

Description of intervention - 51.4.5

Israel-Hamas Conflict
LinkedIn’s Professional Community Policies prohibit misinformation, and misinformation is removed from the LinkedIn platform.

Members that post misinformation are notified of LinkedIn’s removal of their content. State-sponsored attempts to post misinformation, if any, are removed.

LinkedIn also maintains a robust ad-review process to prevent malicious advertising wherein ads related to crises, including the Israel-Hamas conflict, are manually reviewed and approved by our internal team.

Indication of impact - 51.4.6

Israel-Hamas Conflict
Impact metrics for malicious advertising removals are available in SLI 2.1.1 and 2.3.1, whereas metrics related to manipulative behaviors and TTPs are available in SLI 12.1.1 and 14.2.1.

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.5.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
LinkedIn has an internal team of global news editors that provides trustworthy and authoritative content to its member-base at all times. During important events in the Ukraine crisis, this team provides manually curated and localised storylines.

Description of intervention - 51.5.5

Israel-Hamas Conflict
LinkedIn has an internal team of global news editors that provides trustworthy and authoritative content to its member-base at all times. During important events in the Israel-Hamas conflict, this team provides manually curated and localised storylines.

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention - 51.6.2

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
None for LinkedIn

Indication of impact - 51.6.3

War of aggression by Russia on Ukraine
None for LinkedIn

Description of intervention - 51.6.5

Israel-Hamas Conflict
None for LinkedIn

Indication of impact - 51.6.6

Israel-Hamas Conflict
None for LinkedIn