Report March 2026

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Transparency Centre

Commitment 36

Signatories commit to updating the relevant information contained in the Transparency Centre in a timely and complete manner.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 36.1 - Measure 36.2 - Measure 36.3

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 36.3

Signatories will update the Transparency Centre to reflect the latest decisions of the Permanent Task-force, regarding the Code and the monitoring framework.

QRE 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)

With their initial implementation report, Signatories will outline the state of development of the Transparency Centre, its functionalities, the information it contains, and any other relevant information about its functioning or operations. This information can be drafted jointly by Signatories involved in operating or adding content to the Transparency Centre.

N/A

QRE 36.1.2 (for the Commitments 34-36)

Signatories will outline changes to the Transparency Centre's content, operations, or functioning in their reports over time. Such updates can be drafted jointly by Signatories involved in operating or adding content to the Transparency Centre.

N/A

SLI 36.1.1 (for the Commitments 34-36)

Signatories will provide meaningful quantitative information on the usage of the Transparency Centre, such as the average monthly visits of the webpage.

During the period from 1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025, our signatory profile was visited 1,676 times, and our signatory reports were downloaded 11,362 times. The Transparency Centre Webpage overall was visited 30,384 times.

Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 37.1 - Measure 37.2 - Measure 37.3 - Measure 37.4 - Measure 37.5 - Measure 37.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 37.6

Signatories agree to notify the rest of the Task-force when a Commitment or Measure would benefit from changes over time as their practices and approaches evolve, in view of technological, societal, market, and legislative developments. Having discussed the changes required, the Relevant Signatories will update their subscription document accordingly and report on the changes in their next report.

QRE 37.6.1

Signatories will describe how they engage in the work of the Task-force in the reporting period, including the sub-groups they engaged with.

Google has continued to meaningfully engage in Permanent Task-force Plenary sessions and sub groups, including but not limited to participation in meetings, and providing feedback.

Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 38.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Measure 38.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

QRE 38.1.1

Note: The below QRE response has been reproduced (in some instances truncated in order to meet the suggested character limit) from the previous report as there is no new information to share now.

Google has several teams across the company, including teams in Product, Policy, and Trust and Safety, whose work is relevant to but not restricted to Commitments made under this Code. This is core to Google’s mission of connecting people with high-quality information and preventing bad actors from misusing Google services to spread harmful content. To enforce policies fairly, consistently, and at scale, Google relies both on specially-trained experts and machine learning technology and has invested heavily in moderation efforts across platforms. Google enforces its policies globally, including in all EEA Member States and languages.

Commitment 39

Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code’s signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

In line with Code commitments in H2 2025 (1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025), Google provided its seventh report to the European Commission.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Commitment 42

Relevant Signatories commit to provide, in special situations like elections or crisis, upon request of the European Commission, proportionate and appropriate information and data, including ad-hoc specific reports and specific chapters within the regular monitoring, in accordance with the rapid response system established by the Task-force.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

Yes

If yes, list these implementation measures here

As requested by the European Commission, Google provides an Annex on Elections to this report. During the reporting period, Google activated temporary Rapid Response Systems (RRSs) for elections in Czech Republic, Ireland, Moldova and the Netherlands at the EC’s request and also participated in discussions on the establishment of a permanent Elections RRS by the Task-force.

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Commitment 43

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Commitment 44

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

N/A - It was agreed with the European Commission that this commitment is duplicative of the EU Digital Services Act (DSA) requirements, and should therefore be deleted from the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation text. Google is taking steps to be subject to an audit under the DSA, for relevant services.

If yes, list these implementation measures here

N/A

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

N/A

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

N/A

Crisis and Elections Response

Elections 2025

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated

Mitigations in place

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 50.1.1

N/A

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 50.1.2

N/A

Rationale - 50.1.3

N/A

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.4.1

Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) will monitor activity in the EU and around the world, focusing on the safety and security of users and the platforms that help them access and share important information.

Description of intervention - 50.4.2

See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) monitors activity in the EU and around the world.

Indication of impact - 50.4.3

See Commitment 16 for metrics on these efforts, as well as the Q3 2025 Bulletin and Q4 2025 Bulletin.

Specific Action applied - 50.4.4

Google helped develop the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) to streamline the exchange of information between civil society organisations, fact-checkers and online platforms.

Description of intervention - 50.4.5

The EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Rapid Response System (RRS) is a collaborative initiative involving both non-platform and platform Signatories of the Code of Conduct to ensure rapid and effective cooperation and communication between them ahead and during the election period.

The RRS allows non-platform Signatories to swiftly report time-sensitive content, accounts, or trends that they deemed to present threats to the integrity of the electoral process and discuss them with the platforms in light of their respective policies. The RRS also provides an opportunity for platform Signatories to provide feedback - such as on broader trends - to the EU Code of Conduct on Disinformation Permanent Task-force Working Group with Member State authorities, independent experts and civil society organisations.

Indication of impact - 50.4.6

See Commitment 16 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for more details on this effort.

Specific Action applied - 50.4.7

In an effort to equip election campaigns and candidates with best-in-class security features and training, Google’s Project Shield provides free and unlimited protection against Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks - a method of censorship and intimidation.

Description of intervention - 50.4.8

Project Shield allows Google to absorb or deflect the bad traffic in a DDoS attack and act as a 'shield' for smaller websites run by independent media, human rights organisations, election monitoring groups, or in certain cases, government entities or embassies, allowing them to continue operating and defend against these attacks.

Indication of impact - 50.4.9

N/A

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.5.1

Leading up to and during key elections in the EU, Google Search deployed election features to help users prepare for elections and access high-quality election information.

Description of intervention - 50.5.2

In advance of the 2025 elections in the EU, Google launched features to help users prepare for the elections and access high-quality election information. In Ireland, the Czech Republic and Netherlands, for example, we launched Search Homepage Promotions to help users easily find and access election commission websites.

Indication of impact - 50.5.3

No applicable metrics to report at this time.

Specific Action applied - 50.5.4

Google partnered with ThinkYoung, a Belgian think tank, to empower young voters to combat disinformation and develop solutions with a focus on underserved communities.

Description of intervention - 50.5.5

With the voting age lowered to 16+ in some European countries, more young people can participate in the democratic process. To support them, Google.org has awarded a $1 million grant to ThinkYoung, a Belgian think tank looking for innovative solutions to fight election disinformation and reduce barriers to voting using tech. The grant funded youth-led hackathons across Europe, empowering young voters to focus on information quality and develop solutions with a focus on underserved communities. This initiative builds on Google.org's long standing commitment to youth media literacy and online safety, having supported 60+ organisations in this space since 2018.

ThinkYoung launched a call for applications for a chance to test and develop solutions alongside its partners and experts. This initiative has paid out €300,000 in cash and prizes to the winning teams.

Indication of impact - 50.5.6

In October 2025, with Google’s support, the grand winner was awarded €200,000 at The Grand Final in Brussels, and another two winners were each awarded €30,000.

Specific Action applied - 50.5.7

N/A

Description of intervention - 50.5.8

N/A

Indication of impact - 50.5.9

N/A

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 50.6.1

As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google’s products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. This program aims to enhance the public’s understanding of Google’s services and their impact.

Description of intervention - 50.6.2

See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the EU elections in 2025.

Indication of impact - 50.6.3

See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.

Specific Action applied - 50.6.4

Google regularly undertakes stakeholder engagement to discuss Google’s election preparedness.

Description of intervention - 50.6.5

Google’s consultations with civil society organisations, academics and other relevant subject matter experts serve to both inform and share its resources and technologies. Since its launch, the Google Safety Engineering Centre (GSEC) Dublin has held hundreds of public and private engagements, to share Google’s experience of managing content risk and hear from experts across a wide range of topics related to election integrity. Google also offered training to political parties on how to efficiently use Google platforms ahead of elections and secured direct communication channels with all these parties and key candidates.

Indication of impact - 50.6.6

Google will continue to explore opportunities to provide more information in future reports.

Crisis 2025

Threats observed or anticipated

Mitigations in place

Policies and Terms and Conditions

Outline any changes to your policies

Policy - 51.1.1

War in Ukraine: N/A

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.2

War in Ukraine: N/A

Rationale - 51.1.3

War in Ukraine: N/A

Policy - 51.1.4

Israel-Gaza conflict: N/A

Changes (such as newly introduced policies, edits, adaptation in scope or implementation) - 51.1.5

Israel-Gaza conflict: N/A

Rationale - 51.1.6

Israel-Gaza conflict: N/A

Integrity of Services

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.4.1

War in Ukraine: Continued to provide direct assistance to the Ukrainian government and critical infrastructure entities under the Cyber Defense Assistance Collaborative — including compromise assessments, incident response services, shared cyber threat intelligence, and security transformation services — to help detect, mitigate and defend against cyber attacks.

Description of intervention - 51.4.2

War in Ukraine: N/A

Indication of impact - 51.4.3

War in Ukraine: N/A

Specific Action applied - 51.4.4

War in Ukraine: Announced a new Online Safety and Security Partnership with the International Foundation of Electoral Systems (IFES) to provide free security training and tools to high-risk users. Google’s new partnership with IFES combines Google’s account security tools, like the Advanced Protection Program (APP), and IFES’s history in supporting high risk users around the world like journalists, activists and elections management bodies.

Description of intervention - 51.4.5

War in Ukraine: IFES and Google will partner to provide valuable online safety resources to high-risk users across the world, including:

Security training: In collaboration with Google's Safety Engineering Centre, IFES will expand its curriculum to address the evolving threat environment, account security best practices and create content for specialised audiences.
Raising awareness on security tools across 30 countries: Google’s tools and resources for high-risk individuals will be shared to IFES’s international networks, helping more people use things like Advanced Protection Program (APP), Google’s strongest form of account security for high-risk users, Google Titan Security Keys, Project Shield, a free tool to help protect sites from Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, and more.
Industry thought leadership and case studies: IFES will highlight evolving trends and share insights to help Google contextualise how IFES’s partners engage with its products, to keep improving. Google will also provide insights from its Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) to help IFES further understand evolving trends from threat actors trying to undermine the democratic process.

Indication of impact - 51.4.6

War in Ukraine: N/A

Specific Action applied - 51.4.7

War in Ukraine: Expanded eligibility for Project Shield, Google’s free protection against DDoS attack, so that Ukrainian government websites, embassies worldwide and other governments in close proximity to the conflict can stay online, protect themselves and continue to offer their crucial services.

Description of intervention - 51.4.8

War in Ukraine: Project Shield allows Google to absorb or deflect the bad traffic in a DDoS attack and act as a 'shield' for smaller websites run by independent media, human rights organisations, election monitoring groups, or in certain cases, government entities or embassies, allowing them to continue operating and defend against these attacks.

Indication of impact - 51.4.9

War in Ukraine: N/A

Specific Action applied - 51.4.10

War in Ukraine: Added websites and domains identified as threats to Safe Browsing to protect users from further exploitation.

Description of intervention - 51.4.11

War in Ukraine: Google is actively monitoring activity in Eastern Europe with regard to the war in Ukraine. Google sends targeted Gmail and Workspace users government-backed attacker alerts notifying them of the activity. Google encourages any potential targets to enable Google Account Level Enhanced Safe Browsing and ensure that all devices are updated.

Indication of impact - 51.4.12

War in Ukraine: N/A

Specific Action applied - 51.4.13

War in Ukraine: Automatically increased Google account security protections (including more frequent authentication challenges) for people in Ukraine and the surrounding region.

Description of intervention - 51.4.14

War in Ukraine: Google increased account security protections on Workspace and the Advanced Protection Program — which delivers Google’s highest level of security — is currently protecting the accounts of hundreds of high-risk users in Ukraine.

Indication of impact - 51.4.15

War in Ukraine: N/A

Specific Action applied - 51.4.16

War in Ukraine: Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) works to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States, including related to the war in Ukraine. GTIG provides monthly updates about these operations in the TAG Bulletin and in periodic blog posts.

Description of intervention - 51.4.17

War in Ukraine: Throughout 2025, Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) identified several campaigns as part of their investigation into coordinated influence operations linked to Russia.

For additional examples of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms, see the Q3 2025 Bulletin and Q4 2025 Bulletin.

Indication of impact - 51.4.18

War in Ukraine: Please refer to the Q3 2025 Bulletin and Q4 2025 Bulletin for additional metrics on actions taken related to coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms.

Specific Action applied - 51.4.19

Israel-Gaza conflict: Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) works to monitor malicious actors around the globe, disable their accounts, and remove the content that they posted, including but not limited to coordinated information operations and other operations that may affect EU Member States, including related to the Israel-Gaza conflict. GTIG provides monthly updates about these operations in the TAG Bulletin and in periodic blog posts.

Description of intervention - 51.4.20

Israel-Gaza conflict: Throughout 2025, Google’s Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has identified several campaigns as part of their investigation into coordinated influence operations related to the Israel-Gaza conflict. For example, in November 2025, GTIG identified a campaign that was sharing content in English, French, German, Spanish, Arabic, and Russian about various topics including the Israel-Gaza conflict.

For additional examples of coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms, see the Q3 2025 Bulletin and Q4 2025 Bulletin.

Indication of impact - 51.4.21

Israel-Gaza conflict: Please refer to the Q3 2025 Bulletin and Q4 2025 Bulletin for additional metrics on actions taken related to coordinated influence operation campaigns terminated on Google platforms.

Empowering Users

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.1

War in Ukraine: Continued operation of a rapid Air Raid Alerts system for Android phones in Ukraine and expanded initiative to include Artillery Alerts.

Description of intervention - 51.5.2

War in Ukraine: Access to high-quality information is critical for those on the ground and those seeking to flee danger in the region. In the early days of the invasion, Google worked closely with the Ukrainian government to set up a system that sends rapid Air Raid Alerts to Android mobile phones in at-risk areas. In February 2023, Google expanded this initiative to also include Artillery Alerts.

Indication of impact - 51.5.3

War in Ukraine: No applicable metrics to report at this time.

Specific Action applied - 51.5.4

Israel-Gaza conflict: N/A

Description of intervention - 51.5.5

Israel-Gaza conflict: N/A

Indication of impact - 51.5.6

Israel-Gaza conflict: N/A

Empowering the Research Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.1

War in Ukraine: Eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google’s products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. This program aims to enhance the public’s understanding of Google’s services and their impact.

Description of intervention - 51.6.2

War in Ukraine: See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the ongoing war in Ukraine.

Indication of impact - 51.6.3

War in Ukraine: See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.4

War in Ukraine: Ukrainian founders Andriy Kusyy and Ksenia Iliuk created LetsData, which provides businesses and organisations with real-time threat detection and analysis to mitigate the intensified cybersecurity concerns surrounding disinformation as a result of the ongoing war in Ukraine. LetsData is one of 17 companies joining the second cohort of the Google for Startups Growth Academy: AI for Cybersecurity program.

Description of intervention - 51.6.5

War in Ukraine: The ongoing war in Ukraine has intensified the cybersecurity concerns surrounding disinformation. Ukrainian founders Andriy Kusyy and Ksenia Iliuk created LetsData, which provides businesses and organisations with real-time threat detection and analysis to mitigate this challenge. LetsData offers AI radar against disinformation. It provides real-time media and social media monitoring in more than 50 countries, empowering state agencies, businesses and civil societies to proactively navigate risks and seize opportunities in the face of disinformation.

Since launching, their AI-powered solution has experienced rapid growth, establishing operations in the U.S. while continuing to anchor their technology and product development in Europe.

Now, they are one of 17 companies joining the second cohort of the Google for Startups Growth Academy: AI for Cybersecurity program. This group of startups, from nine countries across Europe and North America, will get access to Google’s tools, partners and practices to help them continue to scale — and ultimately make the world a safer place.

Indication of impact - 51.6.6

War in Ukraine: See Commitment 28 for metrics on these efforts.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.7

War in Ukraine: In June 2025, Google announced the final recipients of the Google for Startups Ukraine Support Fund, a $10 million fund providing additional equity-free cash awards along with Google support, mentorship and product expertise to Ukrainian-founded tech companies.

Description of intervention - 51.6.8

War in Ukraine: In March 2022, Google launched the Google for Startups Ukraine Support Fund, which began with an initial $5 million in 2022 and expanded with a new $10 million fund for 2024. This fund provides crucial equity-free cash awards and dedicated Google support to help founders sustain and grow their businesses, strengthen their community and lay a vital foundation for post-war economic recovery.

In June 2025, Google announced the final 35 recipients of the program. These 35 ambitious companies are making incredible technological advancements in critical areas from medical research to AI. Each selected startup receives up to $100,000 in non-dilutive funding, ongoing Google mentorship, product support and up to $350,000 in Google Cloud credits. Google’s goal is to provide them with unique expertise, connections and resources to adapt and expand despite the ongoing war. We’re confident these entrepreneurs and all the others supported by this fund will drive their country's economic recovery and lead the next generation of global tech leaders.

Indication of impact - 51.6.9

War in Ukraine: In November 2025, Google announced that the fund had successfully supported 156 startups in total since the full-scale invasion began in February 2022. Combined, these companies raised over $60 million in follow-on funding, grew their revenues by approximately 100%, and created over 500 new jobs.

Specific Action applied - 51.6.10

Israel-Gaza conflict: As of 28 August 2023, eligible EU researchers can apply for access to publicly available data across some of Google’s products, including Search and YouTube, through the Google Researcher Program. This program aims to enhance the public’s understanding of Google’s services and their impact.

Description of intervention - 51.6.11

Israel-Gaza conflict: See Commitments 26 and 28 in the EU Code of Conduct Transparency Report for details on how Google, including YouTube, provides access to eligible researchers through the Google Researcher Program, which may include content about the ongoing conflict in Israel and Gaza.

Indication of impact - 51.6.12

Israel-Gaza conflict: See Commitments 26 and 28 for metrics on these efforts.