Maldita.es

Report March 2025

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Empowering fact-checkers

Commitment 33

Relevant Signatories (i.e. fact-checking organisations) commit to operate on the basis of strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 33.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 33.1

Relevant Signatories will comply with the requirements of instruments such as being verified signatories of the International Fact-checking Network (IFCN) Code of Principles or the future Code of Professional Integrity for Independent European fact-checking organisations.

QRE 33.1.1

Relevant Signatories will report on the status of their membership to instruments such as those mentioned in Measure 33.1 and the actions taken as a result of that to ensure strict ethical and transparency rules, and to protect their independence.

Maldita.es is an active part of the European Fact-Checking Network (EFCSN). Currently holds the chairmanship of the association's governance body. We have updated our methodologies, policies and procedures to make them even more transparent and accessible, in order to be compliant with the EFCSN Code of Standards. 

Maldita.es has also been a verified signatory of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) Code of Principles since 2018 and has undergone the assessment procedure each year since then. The assessment is accessible here and our declarations on methodology, organisational transparency, and neutrality are also public on our website.

Permanent Task-Force

Commitment 37

Signatories commit to participate in the permanent Task-force. The Task-force includes the Signatories of the Code and representatives from EDMO and ERGA. It is chaired by the European Commission, and includes representatives of the European External Action Service (EEAS). The Task-force can also invite relevant experts as observers to support its work. Decisions of the Task-force are made by consensus.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 37.1 Measure 37.2 Measure 37.3 Measure 37.4 Measure 37.5 Measure 37.6

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 37.6

Signatories agree to notify the rest of the Task-force when a Commitment or Measure would benefit from changes over time as their practices and approaches evolve, in view of technological, societal, market, and legislative developments. Having discussed the changes required, the Relevant Signatories will update their subscription document accordingly and report on the changes in their next report.

QRE 37.6.1

Signatories will describe how they engage in the work of the Task-force in the reporting period, including the sub-groups they engaged with.

Fundación Maldita.es takes part in five different sub-groups within the Task-force: Crisis Response SG (and the Elections Working-Group), Monitoring & Reporting SG, Empowering Fact-checkers SG and Generative AI SG. By attending every meeting of these subgroups, we have shared insights from our daily fight against disinformation, different narratives we encounter and the challenges possessed by AI, as well as what we perceive as shortcomings of other signatories when it comes to fighting and measuring disinformation, particularly during crises and elections. Furthermore, we have raised concerns from the fact-checking community and given constant feedback on the decisions that were being taken.

Monitoring of the Code

Commitment 38

The Signatories commit to dedicate adequate financial and human resources and put in place appropriate internal processes to ensure the implementation of their commitments under the Code.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

Measure 38.1

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Measure 38.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

QRE 38.1.1

Relevant Signatories will outline the teams and internal processes they have in place, per service, to comply with the Code in order to achieve full coverage across the Member States and the languages of the EU.

In order to comply with our commitments under the Code, the entire Public Policy and Institutional Development team is in charge of duties related to both reporting information and engaging with the Task-Force, other signatories and different relevant actors that could contribute to the implementation of the Code. These include contacts with civil society organisations, researchers, public authorities, and online platforms within the Code and also with potential partners that are not yet signatories.
Meanwhile, Fundación Maldita’s debunking team closely searches for and monitors different narratives and networks that promote disinformation, providing valuable evidence to alert relevant Signatories of potential policy breaches or act as an early-warning system. With the aim of identifying larger trends in misinformation, these observations are also being shared with other independent fact-checking organisations within the IFCN and EFCSN.

Commitment 39

Signatories commit to provide to the European Commission, within 1 month after the end of the implementation period (6 months after this Code’s signature) the baseline reports as set out in the Preamble.

We signed up to the following measures of this commitment

In line with this commitment, did you deploy new implementation measures (e.g. changes to your terms of service, new tools, new policies, etc)?

If yes, list these implementation measures here

Do you plan to put further implementation measures in place in the next 6 months to substantially improve the maturity of the implementation of this commitment?

If yes, which further implementation measures do you plan to put in place in the next 6 months?

Crisis and Elections Response

Elections 2024

[Note: Signatories are requested to provide information relevant to their particular response to the threats and challenges they observed on their service(s). They ensure that the information below provides an accurate and complete report of their relevant actions. As operational responses to crisis/election situations can vary from service to service, an absence of information should not be considered a priori a shortfall in the way a particular service has responded. Impact metrics are accurate to the best of signatories’ abilities to measure them].

Threats observed or anticipated


In our analysis on “Platform Response to Disinformation during the EU Election 2024” we observed that the five analysed very large online platforms (Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, X and YouTube) did not act against half of the content debunked by independent fact-checking organisations across Europe ahead of the EP Elections (over 1,300 publications). No visible action was taken on 75% of disinformation content on YouTube and 70% on X, while Facebook responded to 88% of debunked posts, Instagram to 70%, and TikTok to 40%. The 20 most viral posts or videos that received no action by the platforms hosting them accumulate over 1,5 million views each. 

Mitigations in place


Following the results of the analysis of platforms response to debunked disinformation, Maldita.es shared the results of the study with Maldita.es’ stakeholders and in the press, including during the Plenary meeting of the Permanent Task-Force of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, with the intention of bringing public attention to the lack of action of these platforms on disinformation during the electoral period. 


This analysis was a result of Maldita’s involvement in the EFCSN’s project Elections24Check, to which we contributed with over 300 articles related to disinformation on the elections. During the electoral campaign and on the date of the EP elections itself, Maldita provided full coverage which included monitoring disinformation, verification and debunking of hoaxes, analysis of trends, and creation of pre-bunking and explanatory content for our community. Maldita also organised an event in which the speakers reflected on how disinformation narratives are influencing public perception and the European electoral process.



Empowering the Fact-Checking Community

Outline approaches pertinent to this chapter, highlighting similarities/commonalities and differences with regular enforcement.

Description of intervention:

Maldita.es is one of the founders and an active actor of the European Fact-Checking Network (EFCSN). Currently holds the chairmanship of the association's governance body. We have updated our methodologies, policies and procedures to make them even more transparent and accessible, in order to be compliant with the EFCSN Code of Standards. 


Maldita.es has also been a verified signatory of the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) Code of Principles since 2018 and has undergone the assessment procedure each year since then. The assessment is accessible here and our declarations on methodology, organisational transparency, and neutrality are also public on our website.